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491 
IS THE FDA’S NOSE GROWING?: THE FDA DOES 
NOT “EXAGGERATE[] ITS OVERALL PLACE IN 
THE UNIVERSE”1 WHEN REGULATING SPEECH 
INCIDENT TO “OFF-LABEL” PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG LABELING AND ADVERTISING 
In 1999, over two billion retail prescriptions were written and dis-
pensed to patients.2  Chances are, if you are not currently using a pre-
scription drug, eventually you will come to rely on one to increase the 
quality or quantity of your life.  How do you know if the drug will actu-
ally work as your physician says? Or if the drug is safe?  Every year, 
over 125,000 patients die as a direct result of using a prescription drug.3  
Prescription drugs are legally classified as unavoidably unsafe products.4  
For over 60 years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been 
ensuring that the prescription drugs you use are safe and effective 
through the FDA approval process.5  The FDA’s objective has become 
                                                          
 1. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998).  District 
Judge Lamberth made this statement while reprimanding the FDA for promulgating regulations lim-
iting the distribution of materials by prescription drug manufacturers.  See id. at 67. 
 2. Fred Gebhart, Rx Scoreboard, 144 DRUG TOPICS, Apr. 3, 2000, at 31 (2000).  The number 
of people using prescription drugs increased from 60 percent in 1996 to 66 percent in 1999 in a 
sample of 1.4 million insured.  Tom Graham, Study: People Using More Prescriptions, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22177447.  The largest growth was 
seen in patients between the ages of forty-five to sixty-five.  Id.  Eight out of ten senior citizens rely 
on a prescription drug for health maintenance.  Pat Thibaudeau & Alex Deccio, Making Prescrip-
tion Drugs Affordable, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5522664. 
 3. Amy D. White, Note, The Mass Marketing of Prescription Drugs and Its Effect on the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 745, 761 (2000). 
 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  The Restatement further explains: 
[T]here are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite in-
capable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.  These are especially 
common in the field of drugs . . . .  Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied 
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.  The 
same is true of many . . . drugs . . . many of which for this very reason cannot legally be 
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 5. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was passed in 1938.  Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regu-
lation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 215, 
218 (1999).  The Act created the FDA and required all new drugs to be adequately tested, ensuring 
the drug’s safety.  Id. at 224.  In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments were passed, which re-
quired all new drugs to be proven both safe and effective.  Id. at 220. 
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even more critical as the use of prescription drugs increases and the 
amount of information available to consumers increases through Direct-
to-Consumer (DTC) advertising.6  In an effort to accomplish its purpose, 
the FDA promulgates regulations directed towards labeling and advertis-
ing by drug manufacturers, which incidentally affects speech related to 
the sale of prescription drugs. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Comment will begin by reviewing the development of the 
commercial speech doctrine,7 followed by an introduction into com-
pelled speech.8  Next, this Comment will outline the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulations, as found in the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA), regarding prescription drug approval, labeling and 
advertising, including the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act (FDAMA).9  Next, this Comment will focus on two recent cases, 
which held that various FDA regulations violated the drug manufactur-
er’s First Amendment right to engage in commercial speech, examining 
the analysis and reasoning of the courts.10  Finally, this Comment will 
raise possible implications of these recent decisions, by applying the 
constitutional analysis and examining the possible consequences for the 
FDA’s regulatory powers over prescription drugs11 and drug manufac-
turer liability.12 
II.  THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The First Amendment provides in part that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”13  It is a simple command, 
which the courts have not strictly enforced.14  Throughout U.S. jurispru-
                                                          
 6. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of DTC advertising 
by drug manufacturers). 
 7. See infra Section II. 
 8. See infra Section III. 
 9. See infra Section IV. 
 10. See infra Section V. 
 11. See infra Section VI.A. 
 12. See infra Section VI.B. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. See Jo-Jo Baldwin, Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech.  No Longer That Crazy 
Aunt in the Basement, Commercial Speech Joins the Family.  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 167 (1997).  The lack of uniformity in 
speech protection may be attributed to the lack of understanding of the framer’s intent, different 
categories of speech, and potential effects resulting from government restrictions.  Id. at 167-68. 
2
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dence, the courts have created multiple categories of speech,15 each with 
a different applicable legal analysis.16  Commercial speech is one of the 
categories the courts have not provided with full First Amendment pro-
tection.17 
The origins of commercial speech may be traced back to Valentine 
v. Chrestensen.18  Ironically, the Court never actually discussed the First 
Amendment, nor its relation to commercial speech,19 but did remark that 
“the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising.”20 
The concept of commercial speech was not fully revisited by the 
Supreme Court until 1976 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.21 In this groundbreaking decision, 
                                                          
 15. Id. at 168.  Categories of speech include fighting words, pornography, false statements, 
non-commercial and commercial speech.  Id. at 168 n. 40. 
 16. Baldwin, supra note 14, at 168 n. 39.  Courts generally apply strict scrutiny in content-
based restrictions.  Id.  However, a lower scrutiny applies to “low-value” speech, in which there is a 
balancing of interests.  Id.  There are a range of tests for content-neutral based restrictions.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 168.  Possible reasons for the lack of full protection include failure to use the First 
Amendment as a defense in early case law, inapplicability of the First Amendment to the states until 
1931 and viewing commercial advertising as an occupation rather than a form of expression.  Id. at 
169-70.  In addition, the purposes of the First Amendment do not include aspects of commercial 
speech, such as the political process, self-expression, marketplace of ideas, or promotion of social 
stability.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Regulation of Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of 
Goods and Services: A Multifactor Approach, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990).  Overall, commer-
cial speech falls in a gray area between the valid regulation of goods and services and the presump-
tively invalid regulation of speech.  Id. at 18.  For a more in-depth analysis of the development of 
the commercial speech doctrine see P. Cameron DeVore, Advertising and Commercial Speech, in 
COMM. LAW 2000, at 31 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook 
Series No. G0-00BB, 2000). 
 18. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).  The New York City Sanitary Code prohib-
ited distribution of commercial and business advertising in the streets.  Id. at 53.  The plaintiff dis-
tributed double-sided handbills, with an advertisement on one side and a protest against the city on 
the other side.  Id. 
 19. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52-55.  The court focused on the power of government to regulate 
commerce.  See id. at 54-55.  The extent to which a person may promote an occupation is a matter 
of legislative judgment.  Id. at 54. 
 20. Id. at 54.  The court was illustrating the principle that the government may not “unduly 
burden” the freedom of communicating information, whereas the power to regulate commercial ad-
vertising bears no such restriction.  See id.  Later courts relied on Justice Robert’s statement in Val-
entine to distinguish between protection of commercial and non-commercial speech.  See, e.g., 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (“Insist-
ing that the exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other, the 
newspaper here would have us abrogate the distinction between commercial and other speech . . . it 
is [an] unpersuasive [argument].”); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975) (“[T]he adver-
tisements would have received some degree of First Amendment protection . . . .  Advertising is not 
thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection.) (emphasis added). 
 21. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
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the Court held that a state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertis-
ing prescription drug prices violated the First Amendment.22  Flying in 
the face of precedent,23 Justice Blackmun cited four principles justifying 
the protection of purely commercial speech: a speaker’s profit motiva-
tion does not remove speech from First Amendment protection,24 the 
public need for commercial information was as important, if not more 
important, than political information,25 free dissemination and availabil-
ity of commercial information is required to sustain a free economy and 
democracy,26 and the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
preventing the free flow of commercial information for the purpose of 
affecting public decisions.27  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “[i]t is 
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing infor-
mation, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the 
First Amendment makes for us,”28 and abruptly struck down the statute.  
Unfortunately, the Court left the door open for later encroachment by 
stating that the differentiating characteristics of commercial speech 
“suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary . . . .”29 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 773. 
 23. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (unconstitutional prohibition of adver-
tisement by abortion referral agency); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (municipal ordinance prohibiting “help-wanted” advertisements in gen-
der-designated columns was constitutional);Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 24. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.  Justice Blackmun relied on a long line of 
Supreme Court decisions, where labor disputes involving significant economic interests of employ-
ers and employees, retained First Amendment protection for their speech.  See id. 
 25. Id. at 763.  Because many users depend upon prescription drugs to extend the quantity of 
life or improve the quality of life, consumers are extremely interested in receiving price infor-
mation.  Id. at 736-64.  The lack of information resulting from the statutory prohibition will most 
affect the elderly and low-income families.  Id. at 763.  On a more general level, prescription drug 
prices are of general public interest.  Id. at 764. 
 26. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.  “The allocation of our resources. . .will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions” which must be “intelligent and well-
informed.”  Id. 
 27. Id. at 770.  “[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and. . .the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to 
close them.”  Id.  The Court criticized the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy’s “highly paternalistic 
approach” to protecting the public health.  Id. 
 28. Id. at 770.  The Supreme Court did not follow its own balancing test as set forth in Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).  In Bigelow, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction of a 
newspaper editor for publishing an abortion referral service advertisement on First Amendment 
grounds.  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829.  The court balanced the First Amendment interest against the 
public interest served by the regulation.  Id. at 826-29. 
 29. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 n.24 (1976).  The Court supported its conclusion based upon the “commonsense differences” 
between commercial speech and other forms of speech.  Id.  These differences include the greater 
objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech.  Id.  Commercial speech is more objective because 
it may be more easily verifiable by the disseminator and more hardy or durable because its is less 
4
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Relying on its own open door and retreating from its blazon stance 
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court went back to the 
balancing test used in its pre-Virginia cases30 where commercial speech 
had a “limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the scale of First Amendment values.”31  The Court explained 
its reproach was a consequence of potential “dilution, simply by a level-
ing process of the force of the [First] Amendment guarantee with respect 
to non-commercial speech.”32 
Finally, in 1980 the Supreme Court developed a four-part test for 
commercial speech protection in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission.33  The Court instructed: 
We must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it 
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we 
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regu-
lation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and wheth-
er it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.34 
                                                          
likely to be chilled by regulation since it is a means for producing profits.  Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809; Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 31. Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).  See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
447 (state’s restriction of personal solicitation by attorney constitutional); Bates v. St. Bar of Ariz., 
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (blanket restriction of attorney advertising unconstitutional).  In both cases, the 
court balanced the value of the commercial speech at hand with the state’s interest in regulation.  
See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-68; Bates, 433 U.S. at 365-85. 
 32. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.  The courts have given commercial speech limited protection of 
the First Amendment, enabling some regulation that would otherwise be unconstitutional in the 
realm of non-commercial speech.  Id. 
 33. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (prohi-
bition of promotional advertising by electric utility company unconstitutional). 
 34. Id. at 566.  Before applying the four-part test, the court must first determine whether the 
speech involves a legal activity and is truthful because speech, which is inaccurate or relates to ille-
gal conduct, may be constitutionally suppressed.  Id. at 563-64 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 
1, 13 (1979)); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)).  Inac-
curate information includes “communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”  
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.  In applying this test to the case, the prohibited speech was con-
sidered commercial in nature, even though the utility company held a monopoly, and did not in-
volve illegal activity or misleading information.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67.  The gov-
ernment asserted two substantial interests of conserving energy and ensuring fair rates.  Id. at 568-
69.  The government’s interest in equitable rates was only tenuously connected to promotional ad-
vertising.  Id. at 569.  However, the interest in energy conversation was directly linked to advertis-
ing.  Id.  However, the regulation prohibiting advertising by electric utilities did not justify the sup-
pression of electric utility information to the public because it prohibiting all advertising, regardless 
of its effect on energy consumption.  Id. at 570.  Therefore, the regulation was an invalid violation 
of the First Amendment.  Id. 
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After developing the Central Hudson test,35 the Supreme Court 
then grappled with the issue of what constitutes commercial speech.  
Commercial speech was defined as speech that does “no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction.”36  However, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., the Court supplemented that definition with factors to 
help indicate forms of commercial speech: an intent for the speech to 
function as an advertisement, the speech refers to a specific product, and 
the speech is economically motivated.37 
Next, in a surprising decision, the Supreme Court upheld a blanket 
prohibition of casino gambling advertisements directed towards resi-
dents of Puerto Rico in Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism 
Co. of Puerto Rico.38  Relying solely on the legislative findings,39 the 
Court concluded that the “greater power to completely ban casino gam-
bling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling” by the legislature.40  An alternate option of requiring “coun-
terspeech” was also discounted based on the legislature’s failure to pass 
regulations aimed at mandating counterspeech.41 
                                                          
 35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test). 
 36. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385.  This definition has been modified, discarded and 
returned to, as a final definition seemingly eludes the judiciary.  See Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding 
Awkward Alchemy-In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Re-
search Should Not Transmogrify Into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product Manufactur-
ers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 989-1004 (1999).  The Supreme Court has used 
various approaches to define commercial speech including: common sense distinctions, proposing 
commercial transactions, serving economic interests of the speaker and audience and various de-
scriptive factors.  Id.  See also infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the Bolger factors). 
 37. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).  The court relied on 
the combination of characteristics to find informational pamphlets on the use and availability of the 
manufacturer’s product were commercial speech.  Id. at 67.  The pamphlets were acknowledged to 
be advertisements, referred to a specific product and economically motivated, thereby encouraging 
the classification of commercial speech.  Id. at 66-67.  The informational pamphlets were consid-
ered commercial in nature, even though they contained information about important public issues.  
Id. at 67-68.  The Court reasoned that a company has many other non-commercial avenues to in-
form the public of important issues, which would be fully protected.  Id. at 68. 
 38. Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).  The 
Puerto Rico legislature legalized certain forms of gambling, but prohibited any advertisements to 
the people of Puerto Rico, whereas advertisements to tourists were allowed.  Id. at 331-32. 
 39. Id. at 341-45.  The court found that the legislature’s belief that “excessive casino gam-
bling among local residents. . .would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and wel-
fare of the Puerto Rico citizens” was reasonable, and therefore a substantial interest restricting no 
more speech than necessary.  Id. at 341-43 (quoting Appellee’s Brief at 37, Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (No. 84-1903)). 
 40. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.  The court reasoned that advertising regulations were per-
missible because they were less intrusive than completely prohibiting the underlying act altogether.  
Id. at 346. 
 41. Id. at 344.  “We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a ‘counter-
speech’ policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as restriction on 
6
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In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court did not 
extend such deference to the legislature when it struck down a complete 
statutory ban on alcohol pricing information, and held that its analysis in 
Posadas was erroneous.42  Recognizing that some room for legislative 
judgment is appropriate, the Court went back to the Central Hudson test 
requirement that the government must show the regulation would ad-
vance its interest to a “material degree.”43  In striking down the statute, 
the Court also relied heavily on the availability of less restrictive forms 
of regulation to attain the same goal.44 
III.  COMPELLED SPEECH 
The First Amendment includes both the right to speak freely and 
the right to refrain from speaking at all.45  Although the Supreme Court 
has developed a compelled speech doctrine in the context of non-
commercial speech,46 it has not offered any guidance in the area of 
commercial speech.47  However, it seems government mandated warning 
                                                          
advertising.”  Id. 
 42. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508-13 (1996).  “Posadas clearly 
erred in concluding it was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive 
policy.”  Id. at 509.  In this case, Rhode Island prohibited the advertisement of alcohol price infor-
mation.  Id. at 489.  The court held that the ban violated the First Amendment under the Central 
Hudson analysis.  Id. 
 43. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505-09 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).  
The government must show a stronger effectual relationship between the regulation and its interest 
because it has chosen the drastic means of restricting speech to achieve its goal.  Id. at 505.  Alt-
hough the court noted that logic teaches that a lack of advertising will decrease competition, thereby 
increasing prices, in this case, the government failed to provide any actual evidence to show the 
prohibition of alcohol pricing advertisements would significantly decrease market demand.  See id. 
at 506. 
 44. Id. at 507-08.  The court pointed to tax increases and educational programs as less speech-
restrictive means to attain the government’s objective.  Id. at 507. 
 45. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J. concurring)). 
 46. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of a publisher’s 
name and address is an unconstitutional requirement discouraging publication and dissemination of 
work); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute is 
an unconstitutional requirement to affirm an ideology in which one does not believe).  The courts 
have created two theories of protection for compelled, non-commercial speech: ensuring the “free-
dom of belief” and preventing deterrence of a speaker’s protected activity.  Kathryn Murphy, Note, 
Can the Budweiser Frogs Be Forced to Sing a New Tune?: Compelled Commercial Counter-Speech 
and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1204-05 (1998). 
 47. Murphy, supra note 46, at 1211.  Compelled speech within the commercial arena does not 
seem to implicate the constitutional issues raised in the non-commercial arena.  Id. at 1211.  Be-
cause one of the underlying purposes of commercial speech protection is to ensure the “stream of 
commercial speech flows cleanly, as well as freely,” compelling disclosure of truthful information 
does not interrupt the stream.  Id.  (quoting Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
7
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labels, which could be considered compelled speech, are not regarded as 
suspect as other forms of compelled speech.48 
The Second Circuit has touched upon this issue within the food in-
dustry, which is analogous to the FDA’s power in the drug industry.49  In 
International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, a state statute required milk 
labels to disclose any use of synthetic growth hormone in milk produc-
tion.50  However, because the FDA found that milk treated with the 
growth hormone was indistinguishable from untreated milk, the FDA 
did not require any such labeling.51 
The Court found the state requirement compelling manufacturers to 
disclose use of hormones violated the First Amendment.52  The Court 
noted that even though the statute required disclosure of truthful infor-
mation to the public, it must still pass the Central Hudson test to avoid 
constitutional issues.53  Under the test, the “strong consumer interest and 
the public’s ‘right to know’” asserted by the state government were not 
                                                          
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976)).  But see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott Inc., 
521 U.S. 457 (1997) (mandatory funding of generic advertising by state fruit producers not a viola-
tion of the First Amendment).  In Glickman, the court had a perfect opportunity to develop an analy-
sis of compelled, commercial speech, but instead the court treated the compelled funding of com-
mercial expression as the regulation of economics, not commercial speech.  Murphy, supra note 46, 
at 1211-13. 
 48. Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jefferson, “Some Accurate Information is Better Than No 
Information At All”: Arguments Against an Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Based 
on Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 78 OR. L. REV. 605, 635 (1999).  The government may compel 
the disclosure of factual information in labeling for the benefit of health information.  Murphy, su-
pra note 46, at 1221.  Possibly because factual disclosures do not keep consumers in the dark, but 
rather keep consumers better informed, thereby avoiding any paternalistic government purposes.  Id. 
at 1211. 
 49. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 16-250b (1994 & Supp. 1998) (regulating food within the FDCA). 
 50. International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).  The State of 
Vermont gave manufacturers four labeling options under the statute, which informed the consumer 
that rBST (a synthetic growth hormone) may have been used in the milk’s production.  Id. at 70. 
 51. Id. at 69. 
 52. Id. at 72.  “Because compelled speech ‘contravenes core First Amendment values’ appel-
lants have ‘satisfied the initial requirement for securing injunctive relief.’” Id. (quoting Paulsen v. 
County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991)).  The milk producers were entitled to a prelimi-
nary injunction due to irreparable harm to their First Amendment rights.  Id. at 71.  Preliminary in-
junctions are granted when the plaintiff  shows “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of 
success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair 
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the 
preliminary relief.”  International Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 70.  Looking at a number of cases, 
the court noted that loss of any First Amendment rights, even for an insubstantial amount of time, 
will constitute irreparable harm.  Id. at 71. 
 53. Id. at 71.  The court did not determine whether or not the compelled speech was purely 
commercial because even if it was not, the government could not meet its burden under the less rig-
orous Central Hudson test.  Id. at 72-73. 
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substantial enough to justify the restrictions on commercial speech.54 
IV.  FDA PRESCRIPTION DRUG REGULATIONS 
A.  FDA Prescription Drug Approval Process 
The FDA was established by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA)55 to regulate the importation, manufacture, distribution and sale 
of drugs in the United States.56  The FDA must approve all new drugs 
entering the U.S. to ensure both safety and efficacy.57  A manufacturer 
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA, which pro-
vides detailed safety and efficacy data and analysis.58  The NDA must 
also include proposed labeling for the new drug, which is adequate for 
the intended use.59  The FDA will approve a new drug if the manufac-
turer provides “substantial evidence” of its safety and efficacy.60  The 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 73.  The state never asserted an interest in protection of public health and safety, 
since the FDA position clearly showed a lack of health impact.  Id. 
 55. Pub. L. No. 52-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 
(1994 & 1998 Supp.)). 
 56. Carter, supra note 5, at 224 (discussing the complete history of the development of the 
current FDCA).  The FDCA was promulgated under Congress’s power to regulate interstate com-
merce.  Id. at 223.  The FDCA prohibits the movement of adulterated or misbranded food, drugs, 
devices or cosmetics in interstate commerce.  21 U.S.C. § 331 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  The FDA is an 
independent agency within the department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  Carter, supra 
note 5, at 225 (1994).  The FDA’s enforcement authority is derived from Congress’s delegation of 
power to regulate food and drugs to the Secretary of the DHHS, who in turn, delegated the authority 
to the Commissioner of the FDA.  Id. 
 57. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  A new drug is defined as a “drug not 
generally recognized among experts. . .as safe and effective under the conditions prescribed, rec-
ommended or suggested in the labeling thereof.”  21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1994). 
 58. See 21 U.S.C.  § 355(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  Manufacturers may also submit an abbre-
viated new drug application (ANDA) for approval of a bioequivalent drug (also known as a “me 
too” drug).  See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  However, an ANDA is not applicable for 
approval of a drug with an intended new use; manufacturers must submit an NDA for each intended 
new use of a drug which has been approved for a different use.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2000).  For 
a discussion of the sequential phases of clinical studies required for NDA see Carter, supra note 5, 
at 230-35. 
 59. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (proposed labeling required); 21 
U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (denial of approval if labeling inadequate). 
 60. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).  Substantial evidence is defined as: 
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical in-
vestigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be 
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented 
to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the label-
ing or proposed labeling thereof. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
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label will indicate only approved uses, or uses in which there is substan-
tial evidence of their safety and efficacy.61  The label must also reveal all 
medically relevant information regarding the appropriate use of the drug, 
such as dosage, directions for administration, known precautions, warn-
ings, and contraindications.62  Once the new drug has been approved, the 
manufacturer may introduce the drug into interstate commerce, however, 
the FDA still has broad powers to control multiple aspects of the drug’s 
journey.63 
B.  FDA Prescription Drug Labeling Regulations 
Labeling is defined in the FDCA as “all labels and other written, 
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or 
wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”64  The Supreme Court con-
strued the term “accompanying” as matter that supplements or explains 
the product.65  A label is “misbranded” if the label contains false or mis-
leading information,66 which is determined by not only what is stated on 
the label, but also what information is not included on the label.67  A la-
bel is also deemed false or misleading if the label does not contain ade-
                                                          
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).  A manufacturer must show the drug is “safe for use under the condi-
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 62. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(d)(1) (2000). 
 63. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-379 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (regulating the manufacture, packaging, 
distribution, shipment and inspection of prescription drugs). The FDA has promulgated many regu-
lations on communications emanating directly or indirectly from drug manufacturers because of the 
intent to influence the market and decisions of prescribers and/or consumers.  David G. Adams, 
FDA Regulation of Communications on Pharmaceutical Products, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1399, 
1400 (1994).  The regulations are comprehensive and aggressive due to the FDA’s jurisdiction over 
a vast array of products, multiple avenues of communication and the variety of audiences consum-
ing the information.  Id. at 1400-01. 
 64. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1994).  The FDA has further defined labeling as including “bro-
chures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, cata-
logs, house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound recordings, exhib-
its, literature, . . . reprints . . . and references published . . . .” 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2000). 
 65. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948).  The court further explained that phys-
ical attachment is not required for an article to accompany another, only a textual relationship.  Id. 
at 349-50. 
 66. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (applies to both drugs and devices).  Food and 
cosmetics are also subject to the same requirements.  See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (1994) (food); 21 
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994) (cosmetics). 
 67. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994).  Any failure to reveal material facts will be deemed a false 
or misleading label.  21 U.S.C. § 321(n).  The FDA may take into account “representations made or 
suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to 
which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representa-
tions . . . .”  21 U.S.C. § 321(n). 
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quate directions for every use of the drug.68 
C.  FDA Prescription Drug Advertising Regulations 
Advertising is not defined in the FDCA;69 however, the FDA states 
that it includes “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other 
periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through me-
dia such as radio, television, and telephone communication systems.”70  
The FDCA does not directly prohibit false or misleading advertising of 
prescription drugs, however the FDA accomplishes this by mandating 
requirements for advertising.71  If the advertisement fails to reveal all 
material facts, or a fair balance of the information, it is considered “mis-
branded.”72 
Over the past three decades, the FDA has increasingly relaxed ad-
vertising regulations, finally permitting manufacturers to advertise di-
rectly to the public, in the form of direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertis-
ing.73  The effects of DTC advertising have been mixed.  Proponents 
                                                          
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1994).  A drug’s label must include every purpose for which a drug is 
intended to be used, along with adequate information for use.  See e.g., United States v. Device La-
beled “Cameron Spitler, Etc.” 261 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D. Neb. 1966); 21 C.F.R. § 20.100 (2000).  
Therefore, if an intended use is not listed, or if adequate information for every intended use is not 
provided in the label, the drug is misbranded.  See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).  Therefore, if a drug is used 
“off-label,” the label is considered “false and misleading” because the new use or information has 
not been approved by the FDA and included within the labeling.  21 U.S.C. § 352(a).  See also Da-
vid A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 15  HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 693, 745-46 (1978) (discussing the dilemma be-
tween labeling, intended uses and off-label uses by physicians). 
 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994) (advertising does not include labeling).  Although there is 
no definition of advertising in the FDCA, the FDA distinguishes between advertisements and labels 
based upon the form of communication.  See Adams, supra note 63, at 1408.  If the communication 
is written, printed or graphic it is considered a label; otherwise the communication is considered an 
advertisement.  Id. 
 70. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2000). 
 71. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2000).  The advertisement must include a brief summary of side ef-
fects, contraindications, warnings, precautions and effectiveness.  21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2000).  If 
there is not a brief summary, adequate provisions must be made to provide the information in the 
approved labeling.  21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e).  The statement must give a fair balance and not be false, 
misleading or fail to reveal any material facts.  21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5) (2000). 
 72. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994).  The advertisement will be misbranded unless it contains a true 
statement of the name and ingredients and a brief summary of side effects, contraindications and 
effectiveness.  21 U.S.C. § 352(n). 
 73. Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and 
Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 147 (1997) [hereinafter Noah, Advertising Prescription 
Drugs].  Prior to the 1980’s, only drug prices were advertised, as long as there was no mention of 
the drugs safety or efficacy.  Id.  In 1982, the FDA placed a moratorium on advertising, while it re-
viewed its regulations.  Id.  In 1985, the FDA lifted the moratorium, announcing the current adver-
tising regulations were sufficient to protect the public.  Id.  DTC advertisements are found on the 
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believe DTC advertising will ultimately lead to decreased drug prices, 
encourage patients to seek treatment for conditions that would otherwise 
be undiagnosed and/or treated and result in a more enlightened and in-
volved patient increasing the likelihood of better medical outcomes.74  
However, critics believe DTC advertising will adversely affect the phy-
sician-patient relationship.75 
D.  FDA Policy on “Off-Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs and the 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) 
Often, researchers and doctors find new uses for drugs,76 which are 
                                                          
Internet, in newspapers, magazines and television commercials.  White, supra note 3, at 756.  In 
1993, drug manufacturers spent an estimated $100 million, and by 1998, the amount increased to 
over $1 billion.  Id. 
 74. White, supra note 3, at 759.  Manufacturer’s use DTC advertising to encourage patients to 
visit physicians and request prescription drugs for previously untreated conditions, to encourage the 
switch to newly marketed drugs faster, and to create brand loyalty.  Noah, Advertising Prescription 
Drugs, supra note 73, at 150.  DTC advertising is paying off, since the top three newly launched 
drugs in 1999, Celebrex, Viagra and Vioxx, were all heavily advertised to consumers.  Gebhart, 
supra note 2, at 35.  DTC advertising is not the only means to increase sales of prescription drugs, 
but it is a major contributor.  Id. 
 75. White, supra note 3, at 757-58.  The purpose of DTC advertising is to “convince consum-
ers to visit the physicians and request specific drugs for their medical conditions, to encourage them 
to request new drugs more rapidly than physicians might otherwise decide, and to create brand loy-
alty such that the consumer resists the physician’s efforts to change prescriptions.”  Harrison, supra 
note 48, at 616.  In one study, three in ten patients knew which drug they wanted before going to see 
a physician.  Milt Freudenheim, Prescription drug sales soar with help of advertisements, J. REC. 
(Okla. City), Dec. 2, 1998, available at 1998 WL 11962205.  Forty percent of those patients actual-
ly received a prescription for the drug requested.  Id.  In another study conducted in New Zealand 
and the United States, the only countries with DTC advertising, revealed that ninety percent of phy-
sicians felt pressured to prescribe the requested medication, and eighty percent succumbed to the 
patient pressure, even though it was not necessarily the physician’s first choice.  Yonni D. Fushman, 
Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-To-Consumer Advertisement Ex-
ception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (2000).  One reason why 
physicians fall victim to patient pressure is the fear of losing patients, which is very harmful in to-
day’s managed care system.  Id.  The physician’s fear is not exaggerated because seventy-five per-
cent of patients said they would switch physicians in order to receive the medication requested.  Id.  
Some physicians believe the resultant partially informed patient will become aggressive and dis-
trusting.  Gebhart, supra note 2, at 36.  DTC advertising may cause “significant tension.  The physi-
cian can be put in the position of having to unsell the patient on a completely inappropriate product.  
That’s what physicians hate about DTC.”  Id.  (quoting Michael Wilkes, M.D., associate professor 
of medicine at the University of California Los Angeles Medical Center). 
 76. Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, And Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: 
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 196-97 (1999).  Physi-
cians play a crucial role in the development of new drug uses because they are involved with pa-
tients on a routine basis, thereby noting trends and developing theories of treatment, the number of 
practicing physicians exceeds the number of research facilities, and there is a lack of formalized, 
rigid constraints in testing new theories for physicians in practice.  Id. at 196-98.  Also, the financial 
and time costs of conducting research in laboratories are much greater.  Id. 
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different from those uses tested and approved by the FDA, and therefore 
are not provided for in the drug label.77  These “off-label” uses are often 
“necessary for optimal patient care.”78  The FDA’s policy regarding off-
label uses is that “once a [drug] has been approved for marketing, a phy-
sician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient popu-
lations that are not included in the approved labeling.”79  The FDA’s 
policy reflects the lack of power to limit a physician’s practice of medi-
cine.80  The permissibility of off-label uses recognizes the physician’s 
need to treat patients individually and the role of the medical practice in 
developing and researching new drug uses.81  Although the FDA has no 
power to limit off-label prescribing habits, Congress has attempted to 
give the FDA the power to regulate the distribution of off-label infor-
mation by drug manufacturers. 
In 1997, Congress enacted the FDAMA to protect the public’s 
health and safety by ensuring distribution of only truthful, non-
                                                          
 77. Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A First Amend-
ment Analysis of the FDA’s Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of “Off-Label” Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 
991, 992.  See also Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on Pro-
motion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 
59820, 59821 (1994) [hereinafter Citizen Petition].  Off-label use includes any deviation from the 
intended patient, dosage, condition or drug combination identified in the approved drug label.  Sal-
bu, supra note 76, at 188. 
 78. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: De-
bunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 80 (1998).  Researchers estimate that 
25-60% of the 1.6 billion prescriptions written per year are for “off-label” uses.  Id.  The majority of 
medical conditions with standard “off-label” use treatment include cancer, heart disease, AIDS, kid-
ney disease with dialysis, osteoporosis and pediatric uses.  Id.  It is often stated that “if you didn’t 
use the drug in the off-label way, you’d be guilty of [medical] malpractice.”  Id. (quoting Fran Kritz, 
FDA Seeks To Add Drugs’ Uses To Labels, WASH POST, Mar. 29, 1997, at 11). 
 79. Citizen Petition, supra note 77, at 59,821 (quoting FDA Drug Bulletin 12:4-5, 1982).  The 
reasons behind the FDA’s hands-off policy for off-label prescribing is because the off-label use may 
be “appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact reflect approaches to drug 
therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature . . . .  Valid new uses for drugs al-
ready on the market are often first discovered through serendipitous observations and therapeutic 
innovations . . .”  Id.. 
 80. In fact, the FDCA expressly prohibits the FDA from exercising any authority within a 
physicians prescribing practice.  See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  “Nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or 
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate 
health-care-practitioner-patient relationship.”  21 U.S.C. § 396. 
 81. Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 815, 828 
(2000) [hereinafter Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law]. The advantages of off-label prescribing 
include earlier availability of life-saving treatments, encouragement of medical innovation, and de-
creased drug costs resulting from bypassing the costly and timely FDA approval process.  Polubin-
ski, supra note 77, at 1005-09.  The disadvantages include risks to public health and safety, mislead-
ing physicians, and decreasing incentives for FDA approval.  Id. 
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misleading information regarding uses of prescription drugs.82  The main 
thrust of the FDAMA is to regulate the dissemination of off-label uses to 
physicians by drug manufacturers in enduring materials.83  The statute 
specifically allows a drug manufacturer to “disseminate . . . written in-
formation concerning the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not 
described in the approved labeling of a drug” if the manufacturer com-
plies with certain requirements.84  The requirements include: (1) submis-
sion of a new drug application,85 (2) the disseminated information is not 
                                                          
 82. See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 64,074, 64,079 (1997).  Initially, the FDA released two guidances regulating enduring materi-
als and manufacturer involvement in continuing medical education seminars.  See Final Guidance 
on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (1997) (regulating 
manufacturer involvement in CME’s); Final Guidance on Advertising and Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 
52,800 (1996) (regulating manufacturer distribution of enduring materials).  Enduring materials are 
reprints of medical text and peer reviewed journal articles.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1 (1994 & 
Supp. 1998).  CME’s are continuing medical education programs and symposia.  See Final Guid-
ance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (1997).  The 
FDA listed twelve factors to determine whether off-label information was independent of the manu-
facturer’s promotional activity in CME’s.  See id.  The twelve factors are: control of content and 
selection of presenters, disclosure of manufacturer involvement, program focus(es), relationship 
between manufacturer and provider, provider involvement in manufacturer promotion, provider 
reputation, number of presentations, audience selection, discussion opportunity, further dissemina-
tion, promotional activities and complaints.  Id. at 64,092.  Only the policy regarding enduring ma-
terials was codified in the FDCA.  See infra note 83 (detailing the codified provisions of the 
FDAMA).  Passage of the FDAMA was controversial because many felt the changes decreased pub-
lic protection, while others felt the changes were inconsequential.  Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing 
Law, supra note 81, at 831.  President Clinton remarked the FDAMA was a compromise between 
consumer protection and medical information.  Id. 
 83. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (Supp. 1998).  The Act also concerns pediatric drug studies, fast-
track studies and approvals, clinical research, small-scale drug manufacturing, exemptions for in-
vestigational devices and pharmacy compounding among other topics.  See Food and Drug Admin-
istration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-15, 111 Stat. 2296 (now codified in scattered 
sections throughout the FDCA at 21 U.S.C. §§ 343-3 to 397).  The FDAMA also provides for the 
regulation of pharmacy compounding advertisements.  21 U.S.C. § 353a (Supp. 1998).  Pharmacy 
compounding is the “process by which a pharmacist combines, mixes or alters ingredients to create 
a medication that serves the unique needs of specific patients.”  Western States Medical Center v. 
Shalala, 69 F. Supp.2d 1288, 1291 (D. Nev. 1999).  The FDAMA provision prohibiting advertise-
ments of pharmacy compounded drugs violated the First Amendment under the Central Hudson 
framework.  Id. at 1309.  The advertisements were not inherently misleading, and the statute did not 
directly advance the government’s interest of ensuring low volumes of compounded drugs nor was 
it narrowly tailored.  Id. at 1298-1309. 
 84. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a) (Supp. 1998). 
 85. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1998).  An ANDA may be submitted in lieu of the 
NDA if the drug qualifies.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(5) (Supp. 1998) (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 
360aaa-3).  A manufacturer may also disseminate information even though an ANDA has not been 
filed and clinical studies have not been completed, if the manufacturer submits a proposed protocol 
and schedule for the studies to be completed within thirty-six months of the initial dissemination.  
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(c) (Supp. 1998).  A manufacturer may be exempted if it is determined that the 
ANDA is economically prohibitive or the studies would be unethical.  21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(d) 
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abridged, false, misleading or poses a significant health risk,86 (3) any 
clinical research found in the information is not conducted by another 
manufacturer,87 (4) submitting a copy of the disseminated information to 
the FDA,88 and (5) prominently displayed disclosures with the dissemi-
nated information.89  The Act expressly prohibits dissemination of off-
label use information that does not comply with the regulations.90 
V.  RECENT CASES 
A.  Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman 
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) sought to enjoin the 
FDA from enforcing policies restricting dissemination of off-label use 
information by drug manufacturers as expressed in the Guidance Docu-
ments, because the policies violated the First Amendment.91  The 
threshold issue was to determine whether the policies were actually 
regulating conduct or speech; and if the material was deemed speech, 
what level of protection it must be afforded.  The District Court quickly 
discarded the FDA’s argument that the regulations involved conduct.92  
                                                          
(Supp. 1998).  See also supra note 58 (explaining NDA’s and ANDA’s). 
 86. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(2) (Supp. 1998) (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1). 
 87. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(3) (Supp. 1998).  The manufacturer may use another manufactur-
er’s clinical research if the researching manufacturer gives permission.  21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(3). 
 88. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(4) (Supp. 1998).  The manufacturer must also submit any clinical 
trial information relating to the new use, any reports of clinical experience of the new use and a 
summary of this information.  21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(4)(B). 
 89. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(6)(A) (Supp. 1998).  The statement must disclose: (1) the use has 
not been approved by the FDA, (2) the dissemination is at the manufacturer’s expense, (3) authors’ 
names who received compensation from the manufacturer, (4) the approved FDA labeling, (5) 
availability of other approved treatments, (6) name of the funding entity, and (7) a bibliography of 
other articles concerning the off-label use of the drug.  21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1(b)(6)(A). 
 90. 21 U.S.C. § 331(z) (Supp. 1998). 
 91. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998).  The 
Guidance Documents regulate the manufacturer dissemination of copies of medical texts and peer-
reviewed journal articles (enduring materials) and manufacturer promotion of continuing medical 
education programs (CME).  See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational 
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (1997); Final Guidance on Advertising and Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 
52,800 (1996).  The policies concerning enduring materials were codified, after a few changes, in 
the FDAMA; the policies on CME’s were not subsequently codified.  See supra notes 82-83 (dis-
cussing the codification of the FDAMA provisions). 
 92. Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59.  The court explained its conclusion: 
[T]here is little question that the relevant ‘conduct’ is the off-label prescription of drugs by physi-
cians.  The distribution of enduring materials and sponsorship of CME seminars addressing and en-
couraging that conduct is speech. . . .[T]he activities at issue in this case are only ‘conduct’ to the 
extent that moving one’s lips is ‘conduct’. . . .” 
Id. 
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The next issue was how to classify the speech.  The Court refused to 
adopt the FDA’s assertion that the speech being regulated by the Guid-
ance Documents falls outside the scope of First Amendment protection 
because of the federal government’s extensive power to regulate the 
pharmaceutical industry under the FDCA.93  Relying on the “com-
monsense” distinction, the District Court determined that the speech in-
volving enduring materials and CME’s94 was commercial in nature, and 
thus entitled to limited protection.95  The Court went on to analyze the 
restrictions under the Central Hudson four-prong test.96  The speech was 
found to involve lawful acts97 and was not inherently misleading.98  The 
Court acknowledged that the government had two substantial interests: a 
broad interest in protecting public health and safety99 and a more narrow 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 60.  The court dismissed the FDA’s reliance on Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico by stating that the development of the Central Hudson framework, as 
embodied in 44 Liquormart Inc., v. Rhode Island, clearly indicated that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently refused to recognize such an argument.  Id.  See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Posadas and 44 Liquormart decisions).  However, certain communications within 
highly regulated areas may be restricted without violating the First Amendment.  See Ohralik v. 
Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).  Permissible regulations involve exchange of securi-
ties information, corporate proxy statements, competitor price and production information and retal-
iation threats during labor disputes.  Id. 
 94. See supra note 82 (defining enduring materials and CME’s). 
 95. Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
 96. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test). 
 97. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998).  The 
court stated that the FDA’s view that the speech involved illegal activities was “tautogical.”  Id.  at 
66.  The court reasoned that the inquiry is whether the conduct that the speech proscribes is illegal, 
not whether the speech itself is illegal.  Id.  (emphasis added).  The court further supported its con-
clusion by characterizing the FDA’s argument as a slippery slope; if the court agreed with the 
FDA’s argument, the government could then defeat all commercial speech protection by declaring 
commercial speech illegal.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 69.  “In asserting that any and all scientific claims about the safety, effectiveness, 
contraindications, side effects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are presumptively untruth-
ful or misleading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its 
overall place in the universe.”  Id. at 67.  The court supported its finding by first explaining the gov-
ernment can not reduce its burden by merely showing the speech is “potentially misleading.”  Id. at 
66.  Rather, the government must show the speech is “inherently misleading” or “more likely to 
deceive the public than inform it.”  Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).  The court noted that prior to litigation, the FDA stated that 
the enduring materials and CME’s were “clearly potentially misleading,” and not inherently mis-
leading.  Id. at 67 (citing Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activi-
ties, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,079 (1997)).  The court also pointed to the FDA’s willingness to freely allow 
dissemination of the same information upon a physician’s own request or from any other source 
than the manufacturer.  Id. at 67. 
 99. Id. at 69.  Ironically, the court stated: 
[T]here are few, if any, more important functions performed by any regulatory agency 
than the function this case concerns-ensuring that when a citizen takes a prescription 
drug, that individual has absolute assurance that the product is safe and effective for the 
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interest in providing manufacturers with incentives to pursue FDA ap-
proval of new uses for prescription drugs.100  Focusing on the more nar-
row interest, the Court found that the Guidance Documents directly and 
materially advanced the interest of encouraging manufacturers to apply 
for subsequent approval of the off-label use.101  However, the restrictions 
of speech found in the Guidance Documents were more extensive than 
necessary to serve the government’s interest.102  Since the Guidance 
Documents were found unconstitutional, the FDA was enjoined from en-
forcing any provisions.103 
Subsequently, the Guidance Documents concerning enduring mate-
rials were superseded by the FDAMA, which contained essentially the 
same regulatory provisions found in the FDA’s written policy.104  Dur-
ing a rehearing, the District Court ruled that the commercial speech doc-
trine still applied even though, as the FDA asserted, the FDAMA “af-
firmatively permits” speech as long as the manufacturer complied with 
                                                          
condition for which his physician has prescribed it. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 70.  The court seems to give deference to Congress’s conclusion that approval of all 
drug uses is mandated by the benefit to the public.  See id. at 71.  However, the government’s inter-
est in “ensuring physicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that they may make in-
formed prescription choices” was not a substantial interest because the judicial system has consist-
ently struck down the paternalistic assumption that the public will use information unwisely to 
justify suppression of commercial speech.  Id. at 69-70 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)). 
 101. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1998).  The 
government had to meet this burden by “demonstrat[ing] that the harms it recites are real and that its 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree” rather than mere “speculation or conjec-
ture.”  Id. at 72. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)).  In this case, the government did 
not provide substantial evidence to show that the regulation would actually compel manufacturer’s 
to seek subsequent approval of the off-label use.  Id.  However, the court relied on WLF’s argument 
to ultimately support a finding of direct advancement.  Id.  The WLF conceded that manufacturers 
disseminate off-label information rather than applying for subsequent approval due to the delayed 
time to receive such approval.  See id. 
 102. Id. at 74.  Recognizing that the commercial speech doctrine does not require finding that 
the government has used the least restrictive means possible to advance a substantial interest, the 
means must still reasonably fit the end sought.  Id. at 72.  The court looked to the fact that the less 
burdensome alternative, requiring full disclosure by the manufacturer, was available to the FDA.  
Id.  at 73.  The court reasoned that mandating full disclosure alleviates concerns that the off-label 
information would be potentially misleading, encourages subsequent approval and protects the 
truthful information, which the manufacturers want to distribute.  Id. at 73. 
 103. Id. at 74. 
 104. The injunction was issued on July 30, 1998.  However, Congress enacted the FDAMA on 
November 20, 1997, which became effective on November 21, 1998.  The FDA petitioned the court 
to amend the injunction to limit its application solely to the Guidance Documents, and not the 
FDAMA.  See Washington Legal Foundation v. Freidman, 36 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17-18 (D.D.C. 1999).  
The District Court declined, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the 
possible application of the prior injunction to the FDAMA.  See id. at 20. 
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the provisions.105  The Court held fast to its previous findings and de-
clared that the FDAMA was an unconstitutional restriction of commer-
cial speech106 and again enjoined the FDA from enforcing the statute.107 
                                                          
 105. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D.D.C. 1999).  The 
FDA’s argument was “‘preposterous’ . . . [because] the First Amendment is premised upon the idea 
that people do not need the government’s permission to engage in truthful, nonmisleading speech 
about lawful activity.”  Id. 
 106. Id. at 87.  The court admonished the FDA’s “tactic” and pointed to other options such as 
banning off-label prescriptions, prohibiting profits from off-label uses, or pursuing more misbrand-
ing actions.  Id.  However, these measures have been criticized as too extreme and an invasion into 
the practice of medicine.  Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 833. 
 107. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89.  The District Court concluded: 
In conclusion, the Court finds that the FDAMA unconstitutionally restricts protected 
commercial speech. 
. . . . 
THE COURT FINDS AND DECLARES that the policies, rules and regulations of the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) set forth in the Guidance to Indus-
try on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data, 61 Fed.Reg. 52800 
(Oct. 8, 1996) (the “Reprint Guidance”), Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of 
Reference Texts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996) (the “Textbook Guidance”), and Fi-
nal Guidance on Industry Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.Reg. 
64074 (Dec. 3, 1997) (the “Final CME Guidance”), are contrary to rights secured by the 
United States Constitution. . . . 
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS AND DECLARES that the policies, rules and regula-
tions of the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) set forth in the Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aaa through 360aaa-6, 
and in the FDA’s Final Rule on the Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New 
Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 21 C.F.R. Part 99, are contrary to 
rights secured by the United States Constitution. . . . 
THE COURT HEREBY ENJOINS Defendants. . .from application or enforcement of 
any regulation, guidance, policy, order or other official action, as follows: 
1. Defendants SHALL NOT in any way prohibit, restrict, sanction or otherwise seek to 
limit any pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer or any other person: 
a) from disseminating or redistributing to physicians or other medical professionals any 
article concerning prescription drugs or medical devices previous published in a bona 
fide peer-reviewed professional journal, regardless of whether such article includes a 
significant or exclusive focus on unapproved uses for drugs or medical devices that are 
approved by FDA for other uses and regardless of whether such article reports the origi-
nal study on which FDA approval of the drug or device in question was based; 
b) from disseminating or redistributing to physicians or other medical professionals any 
reference textbook including any medical textbook or compendium) or any portion 
thereof published by a bona fide independent publisher and otherwise generally available 
for sale in bookstores or other distribution channels where similar books are normally 
available, regardless of whether such reference textbook or portion thereof includes a 
significant or exclusive focus on unapproved uses for drugs or medical devices that are 
approved by FDA for other uses; 
c) from suggesting content or speakers to an independent program provider in connec-
tion with a continuing medical education seminar program or other symposium regard-
less of whether unapproved uses for drugs or medical devices that are approved by FDA 
for other uses are to be discussed. 
. . . . 
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The FDA subsequently appealed.108  The Court of Appeals dis-
missed the appeal and vacated the District Court’s decision, which de-
clared the FDAMA and Guidance Documents unconstitutional.109  The 
Court expressed the intention that the ruling at hand did not review the 
holdings of the lower court.110  The District Court’s decision was vacat-
ed due to a lack of constitutional controversy since the FDA asserted that 
the FDAMA and Guidance Documents did not “independently authorize 
the FDA to prohibit or sanction speech.”111  However, the Court conced-
ed that the FDA still had the power to use the “promotional conduct” as 
evidence of misbranding if the conduct fell outside of the proscribed 
regulations.112  Nevertheless, the Court indicated that a misbranding ac-
tion under these circumstances might still violate the First Amend-
ment.113 
B.  Analyzing the WLF Decision 
So exactly where does that leave drug manufacturers with respect to 
dissemination of off-label uses?  If a manufacturer follows the regula-
tions as found in the FDAMA “safe harbor,” dissemination of infor-
mation cannot be prohibited.114  If a manufacturer does not follow the 
                                                          
5. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit Defendants’ application or enforcement of 
any rules, regulations, guidances, statutes or other provisions of law that sanction the 
dissemination or redistribution of any material that is false or misleading. In addition, 
Defendants may require any pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer that spon-
sors or provides financial support for the dissemination or redistribution of articles or 
reference textbooks or for seminars that include references to unapproved uses for drugs 
or medical devices that are approved by FDA for other uses to disclose (i) its interest in 
such drugs or devices, and (ii) the fact that the use discussed has not been approved by 
FDA. 
Id. 
 108. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 109. Id.  at 337. 
 110. Id. at 337 n.7.  “In disposing of the case in this manner, we certainly do not criticize the 
reasoning or conclusions of the district court.  As we have made clear, we do not reach the merits of 
the district court’s First Amendment holdings and part of its injunction still stands.”  Id. 
 111. Id. at 335. Rather, the FDA asserted at oral argument that the regulations merely estab-
lished a “safe harbor” for dissemination of information falling within the regulations, ensuring cer-
tain conduct would not be used as evidence of misbranding by the FDA.  Id.  And 21 U.S.C. § 
331(z), which prohibits dissemination in violation of the FDAMA, merely provides that a manufac-
turer who does not follow the “safe harbor” provisions, may be liable.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 336. 
 113. Id. at 336 n.6.  The FDA still has the ability to use any promotional conduct outside of the 
safe harbor as evidence in a misbranding enforcement action, however the manufacturer may still 
argue such an action violates the First Amendment.  Id. 
 114. Richard M. Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not with a Bang, But a Whimper, 55 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 477, 486 (2000).  By statute, manufacturers are prohibited only from disseminating 
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FDAMA regulations, the situation becomes questionable.115  Scholars 
are unsure what the Court of Appeals meant when it “vacated 
the. . .decisions and injunctions” of the lower court.116  Most likely, the 
battle has only begun, since the Court acknowledged the FDA’s ability 
to institute misbranding actions against manufacturers and the potential 
for First Amendment violations within this context.117 
Assuming the analysis of the First Amendment issues by the Dis-
trict Court is still valid, the findings can be criticized on various 
grounds.118  The FDA unsuccessfully argued that the manufacturer’s 
                                                          
information in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa.  See 21 U.S.C. § 331(z) (Supp. 1998).  Section 
360aaa only provides certain conditions for disseminations affirmatively permitted by the FDA.  
Cooper, supra, at 481.  Therefore, section 360aaa is correctly construed as creating a “safe harbor.”  
Id. 
 115. See Cooper, supra note 114, at 487.  See also Linda S. Svitak & Peter J. Goss, Drug and 
Device Litigation in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 271, 289-90 (2000). 
 116. Cooper, supra note 114, at 487.  Cooper suggests multiple options in construing the Court 
of Appeals decree regarding dissemination of information outside of the regulations: 
[T]he situation is unclear and depends on the status of the district court’s final order. 
That order is divided into two sections, one that “finds and declares,” and another that 
“enjoins.”  The court of appeals vacated “the district court’s decisions and injunctions 
insofar as they declare the FDAMA and the CME Guidance unconstitutional.”  It is not 
absolutely clear what the court of appeals meant by “decisions and injunctions.” Presum-
ably, the term “decisions” encompasses opinions and orders. In this context, the term 
“injunctions” is odd and ambiguous.  It is odd because it is plural: although the district 
court issued more than one order in the case, it issued only one amended final order, 
which was the order from which the appeal was taken. The term “injunctions” is also 
ambiguous because it is not clear whether it applies to the amended final order in its en-
tirety or only to the injunctive section of the amended final order, i.e., the second section. 
If the D.C. Circuit’s statement about vacating was intended to refer to the district court’s 
amended final order in its entirety, then it would be natural to treat the first, declaratory 
section of the order as vacated and the second, injunctive section as surviving. The sec-
ond section, which includes the three operative prohibitions applicable to FDA enforce-
ment actions, does not declare anything unconstitutional, and so, arguably, survives. If, 
however, the vacation order vacated the declaratory section as part of the district court’s 
“decisions” and was intended to refer specifically to the injunctive section of the district 
court’s order in order to address that specific section, then, apparently, part of that in-
junctive section has been vacated and part survives.  In that scenario, it is not easy to tell 
which part has been vacated and which survives. In light of the colloquy during oral ar-
gument, however, it may be doubted whether the court of appeals really intended to 
leave the entire injunctive section intact without reviewing it on the merits.  In sum, the 
court of appeals has created a mess. . . .” 
Id. 
 117. See supra notes 66-68, 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the misbranding provi-
sions of the FDCA).  See also infra Section VI.A. (analyzing the constitutionality of the FDA’s au-
thority to regulate manufacturer labeling and advertising under the Central Hudson test). 
 118. The WLF also attempted to argue that the speech was not commercial in nature, therefore 
worthy of full First Amendment protection.  See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 51, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1998).  Many scholars agree, reasoning that scientific research is often 
not verifiable, has the potential to be “chilled.”  E.g., Smith, supra note 36, at 1022-25; John Kamp 
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conduct was illegal because it was considered misbranding under the 
FDCA. 119  In doing so, the Court failed to focus on the fact that before 
Congress’s enactment of the FDAMA, the FDA considered any such 
conduct by a manufacturer as evidence of misbranding, therefore the 
FDAMA actually enabled manufacturers to act in a manner that was en-
tirely prohibited previously.120  Ironically, the Court also stated that the 
lawfulness of physician off-label prescribing does not enable manufac-
turers to circumvent the FDA’s required new drug approval process.121  
However, the Court later noted that the government’s interest in ensur-
ing ample incentives to approve off-label uses is “one of the few mecha-
nisms available to the FDA to compel manufacturer behavior is to con-
strain their marketing options.”122  The Court also erred by finding the 
regulations were more extensive than necessary, because the FDAMA 
only prohibits manufacturers from distributing the information, while 
other entities are still free to disseminate the same information.123 
 
                                                          
et al., FDA Marketing v. First Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal Challenges to Off-
Label Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 563-63 
(1999) (arguing the materials do not exemplify any commercial speech traits).  Another compelling 
reason is the lack of rationale for transforming non-commercial speech into commercial speech  
when distributed by a manufacturer: “when considered outside of the context of manufacturer pro-
motion. . .CME seminars, peer-reviewed medical journal articles, and commercially-available medi-
cal textbooks merit the highest degree of constitutional protection.”  Washington Legal Foundation, 
13 F. Supp. 2d at 62.  See also Smith, supra note 36, at 1017-19. 
 119. See U.S.C. § 352(a), (f) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  The FDA’s argument has also been criti-
cized because the government could bypass the First Amendment by passing a law to prohibit such 
speech; even so, courts must still determine whether the law unduly burdens free speech.  E.g., 
Polubinski, supra note 77, at 1024; Kamp, supra note 118, at 559. 
 120. Cooper, supra note 114, at 480.  See U.S.C. § 352(f) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (completely 
prohibiting dissemination of off-label information).  Previously the FDA’s actions were not consid-
ered a violation of the First Amendment.  See Adams, supra note 63, at 1414 & n.61.  The FDA also 
has “told” manufacturers what information to include or exclude in package inserts, without raising 
First Amendment issues.  Polubinski, supra note 77, at 1012.  The FDA’s ability to regulate pre-
scription drug advertising has yet to be questioned, although the issue is now questionable after 
Pearson v. Shalala.  See infra  Sections V.C. & V.D. (discussing and analyzing Pearson v. Shalala). 
 121. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71 n.4 (D.D.C. 1999).  
“There is no support for the contention that this approval process is discretionary. . . .”  Id.  Howev-
er, the court’s final ruling, in effect, allows manufacturer discretion in determining whether to pur-
sue FDA approval of the off-label use. 
 122. Id. at 72. 
 123. See Adams, supra note 63, at 1409-14.  Information regarding off-label uses is not subject 
to regulation by the FDA, receiving full First Amendment protection, if research is independent and 
original or the physician requests the information from the manufacturer.  Id. 
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C.  Pearson v. Shalala 
The FDA was also involved in a very similar case dealing with die-
tary supplements in Pearson v. Shalala.124  The FDA declined to author-
ize four health claims125 for a dietary supplement label, because the 
manufacturer had failed to show that there was significant scientific 
agreement among experts that the evidence available supported such 
health claims.126  Subsequently, the supplement marketers brought an ac-
tion alleging a violation of the First Amendment. 
In applying the Central Hudson test, the District Court found that 
the health claims were inherently misleading because they did not meet 
the threshold requirement of significant scientific agreement, and there-
fore were not scientifically proven.127  Also, the average consumer 
lacked the necessary ability to evaluate health claims on dietary supple-
ments, which further supported the Court’s finding that the labeled 
health claims were inherently misleading.128  The FDA also asserted 
                                                          
 124. Pearson v. Shalala, 14 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 1998).  A dietary supplement is a: 
product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that bears or contains one or 
more of the following dietary ingredients: (A) a vitamin; (B) a mineral; (C) an herb or 
other botanical; (D) an amino acid; (E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement 
the diet by increasing the total dietary intake; or (F) a concentrate, metabolite, constitu-
ent, extract, or combination of any ingredient [described above]; 
21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).  Dietary supplements are not subject to the same regu-
lations as drugs, however health claims may be made if the FDA approves the claims prior to mar-
keting.  See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
 125. A health claim is “any claim made on the label or in labeling of a food, including a dietary 
supplement, that expressly or by implication . . . , characterizes the relationship of any substance to 
a disease or health-related condition.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1) (2000).  In this case, the marketer 
wanted to use four claims on the label: (1) antioxidant vitamins decrease cancer, (2) fiber decreases 
colorectal cancer, (3) fatty acids decrease heart disease and (4) folate decreases neural tube defects 
during pregnancy.  Pearson, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
 126. Id.  See also 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (2000) (FDA’s health claim safe harbor for dietary 
supplements is authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D)).  The FDA requires proof of significant sci-
entific agreement because of testing difficulties for health claims: 
Many of the diet-disease associations of potential relevance for health claims relate to 
chronic disease processes for which diet is one of many possible causes and which, for 
both ethical and practical reasons, are often not subject to direct experimentation.  Thus, 
different types of evidence are usually considered in attempting to establish that a causal 
association actually exists and that dietary change would have preventative value.  
Where human experimentation is not appropriate, other approaches are useful. . . .  [Test-
ing for disease prevention] is more expensive and difficult than determination of an ef-
fect in a population with a disease [which is performed for new drugs in clinical trials.] 
Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 849 (quoting Commission on Dietary Sup-
plement Labels, Report of the Commission on Dietary Supplements Labels 30, 31, 70 (1997)). 
 127. Pearson, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 18.  The FDA showed that health claims based upon prelimi-
nary studies and hypothetical associations create an “‘ill-defined association’ in the mind of con-
sumers that is not based on solid, reliable, scientific data.”  Id. 
 128. Id.  Relying on In re R.M.J., the court noted that speech is inherently misleading when the 
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substantial government interests in protecting the public and preventing 
consumer fraud.129  In addition, the District Court found that the scien-
tific standard directly advanced the government’s interest and was no 
more extensive than necessary, and subsequently upheld the FDA’s 
health claim regulation.130 
The Court of Appeals reversed.131  The Appeals Court agreed that 
the FDA met the burden of establishing a substantial government interest 
by asserting concerns of protecting public health and safety and prevent-
ing consumer fraud.132  However, the Court disagreed with the FDA’s 
argument that health claims were inherently misleading.133 The Appeals 
Court held that the regulation did not directly advance the government’s 
interest in protecting the public’s health and safety, because the FDA 
never claimed that dietary supplements were harmful.134  Rather, the 
Court believed the FDA had an underlying premise, that due to consum-
er limitations, only products with unquestionable health benefit claims 
should be available, which the court regarded as suspect.135  The Court 
                                                          
audience does not possess the requisite knowledge to evaluate it.  See In re R.M.J, 455 U.S. 191 
(1982) (topic and audience restrictions on lawyer advertising violated the First Amendment).  In this 
case, the Court distinguished the in-person solicitation by an attorney in Bates v. State Bar of Arizo-
na from the mailings used in the present case.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200-04.  The Court re-
marked that advertising is misleading when the public lacks the requisite knowledge or sophistica-
tion to understand the information.  Id. at 200-02.  However, the method of advertising employed in 
the present case did not pose a risk of consumer deception.  Id. at 206-07. 
 129. Pearson v. Shalala, 14 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1998).  The legislative history sug-
gested that the purpose of the regulation was to protect public health and safety, prevent unsubstan-
tiated health claims and ensure the use of reliable scientific data.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 20.  The regulation directly advanced the government interest because it only per-
mitted claims with significant scientific agreement.  Id.  Consumers are not capable of researching 
and independently verifying the claims based upon personal experience.  Id.  Since the regulation is 
only required to be reasonable, not perfect, the regulation was not more extensive than necessary 
because the regulation only applied to health claims on labels.  Id. (citing Board of Trustees of the 
St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)).  The regulation did not apply to health claims made 
in scientific research journals or magazines.  Pearson, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
 131. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 132. Id. at 655-56. 
 133. Id. at 655.  The court felt that the health claims would only be inherently misleading if 
they would have “an awesome impact on consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to 
exercise any judgment at the point of sale. . .as if. . .buy[ing] something while hypnotized, and 
therefore they are bound to be misled.”  Id.  The court rejected this presumption.  Id. 
 134. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656.  The court expressed its opinion that “drugs, on the other hand, 
appear to be in an entirely different category-the potential for harm is much greater” than dietary 
supplements.  Id. at 656 n.6. 
 135. Id. at 656.  Since the court did not find any assertion of direct harm to the consumer’s 
health, the only other harm possible would be a “crowd[ing] out” of known beneficial products by 
not-so-known beneficial products, which may be indirectly accomplished by the regulation.  Id.  
However, the government interest in the prevention of fraud was directly advanced by the regula-
tion.  Id. 
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did agree that some health claims would mislead consumers, therefore 
pre-approval requirements would prevent any misleading labels.136  
However, the regulation still failed because it was more extensive than 
necessary, since a less restrictive regulation requiring disclaimers was 
available.137 
D.  Analyzing the Pearson Decision 
The Court made several errors in applying the Central Hudson test 
to the regulated health claims.  The legislature was not afforded any def-
erence in its decision to regulated dietary supplement health claims.138  
Usually, the government is given some latitude when the regulation in-
cidentally restricts truthful information.139  The Court simply rejected the 
FDA’s assertion that the claims were harmful to the public, and substi-
tuted its own judgment in a highly specialized, technical field.140  The 
Court also misconstrued the final prong by requiring the FDA to regulate 
with “surgical precision” in order to ensure only false or misleading 
speech was prohibited.141  However, the test only requires the govern-
ment to make regulations that are not more extensive than necessary; it 
does not require the government to use the least restrictive regula-
tions.142  Therefore, the Court’s reliance on the FDA’s failure to use dis-
                                                          
 136. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.2d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 137. Id. at 657-59.  The court ultimately placed the burden of drafting sufficient disclaimers for 
the health claims on the FDA.  Id. at 659. 
 138. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986); 
See also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.  Courts owe the legislature considerable defer-
ence to the policy judgments made, especially in commercial speech.  David C. Vladeck, Truth and 
consequences: The perils of half-truths and unsubstantiated health claims for dietary supplements, 
J. PUB. POL’Y & MKT, Apr. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23815812.  Previously, Congress refused 
to repeal or amend the regulations at issue because it felt the high evidentiary standards required by 
the FDA were appropriate measures to protect the public. 
 139. See Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).  Overinclusiveness is allowed if 
there is a history of abuse, no other effective regulatory options are available and the damage to the 
consumers is difficult or impossible to repair.  Vladeck, supra note 138. 
 140. The court distinguished between dietary supplements and prescription drugs on the basis 
that dietary supplements are not harmful since the FDA has declined to promulgate regulations 
similar to those for prescription drugs.  Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 
1999).  However, dietary supplements may be harmful.  Howard M. Rubin, Courts, Congress Re-
examine Nondrug Products; Makers of Dietary Supplements Now Can Tout Health Benefits with 
less FDA Interference, NAT’L L.J., July 5, 1999, at B8.  The trend is to allow consumers to deter-
mine the need and effectiveness of a drug without FDA involvement or protection.  Id.  However, 
there is no regulation prohibiting marketing of a drug where the doses are ineffective for the claim 
being promoted.  Id. 
 141. Vladeck, supra note 138. 
 142. See Board of Trustees of the St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).  The 
primary issue before the Court in Fox was the interpretation of the fourth prong of the Central Hud-
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claimers is unwarranted. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT DECISIONS FOR FDA REGULATIONS 
A.  Are FDA Labeling and Advertising Regulations Prohibiting Off-
Label Use Information Unconstitutional under Central Hudson? 
Although these two decisions are prone to criticism, the analysis 
and reasoning could arguably affect the FDA’s authority over prescrip-
tion drug regulation.  After WLF, the FDA may not prohibit the dissemi-
nation of off-label information to health care professionals.143  After 
Pearson, the FDA may not prohibit health claims on dietary supplement 
labels.144  The ultimate concern is that the reasoning of these two deci-
sions will align to prevent the FDA from prohibiting off-label use claims 
on prescription drug labels and in advertisements to the public. 
The FDA’s ability to prohibit the inclusion of off-label use infor-
mation on labels and advertisements is found within its authority to mis-
brand prescription drugs.145  To determine if such an alignment is possi-
ble, it is necessary to visit the Central Hudson test146 once again to 
determine if the FDA may prohibit manufacturers from placing off-label 
use claims in labeling and advertisements to the public by declaring the 
drug misbranded without violating the manufacturer’s First Amendment 
rights. 
1.  Are Labels and Advertisements Commercial Speech? 
Before embarking upon the Central Hudson test, the threshold is-
sue, which must be addressed, is whether off-label use claims on labels 
or in advertisements are commercial speech.  The act of labeling and ad-
vertising off-label uses can be classified as conduct, not just speech.147  
The difficulty between such a distinction is prevalent in highly regulated 
                                                          
son test, where restrictions may not be “more extensive than is necessary.”  Id. at 476.  The Court 
concluded that the term “necessary” requires something “short of a least-restrictive-means stand-
ard,” even though prior Supreme Court cases may have conflicted with this interpretation.  Id. at 
477. 
 143. See supra notes 91-113 and accompanying text (discussing the WLF decision). 
 144. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Pearson decision). 
 145. See supra notes 66-68 & 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the misbranding provi-
sions of the FDCA). 
 146. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test). 
 147. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 834.  The legality must only relate 
to the underlying conduct to avoid any circular reasoning.  See supra note 97 and accompanying 
text (discussing the FDA’s argument in WLF). 
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areas, such as prescription drugs.148  When pre-market approval of a new 
drug is required, the FDA is regulating a product, not speech.149  How-
ever, once the product is on the market, any similar regulation is seen as 
regulating the manufacturer’s speech.150 
If labeling and advertising are not considered conduct, but rather 
speech, then advertisements may quickly be discarded as commercial 
speech because inherent in an advertisement is a proposal for a commer-
cial transaction.151  However, drug labels are not so easily classified as 
commercial speech because they do not necessarily propose a commer-
cial transaction.152  The information on the prescription drug label is not 
made available to either the consumer or the physician to influence the 
decision to purchase or prescribe, a central function of commercial 
speech.153However, the Supreme Court remarked in U.S. v. Kordel, that  
“[e]very labeling is in a sense an advertisement.”154  Many courts have 
also considered information on labels to be commercial speech.155  Most 
likely advertisements, as well as labels, will be considered commercial 
speech in light of previous decisions including Pearson and WLF.156 
                                                          
 148. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 876-77. 
 149. Id. at 876-77. 
 150. Id. at 877.  But pre-market approval of a new drug and approval of an off-label use are 
treated the same under FDA regulations; without approval in either instance, the drug is misbrand-
ed.  See 21 U.S.C §§ 331(a), (d) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting introduction of misbranded drugs 
into interstate commerce); 21 U.S.C § 352(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (false or misleading labeling is 
misbranding); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (prohibits introduction of new drugs into inter-
state commerce without FDA approval). 
 151. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining commercial speech). 
 152. Geyh, supra note 17, at 51. Information on labels aren’t necessarily commercial speech 
because of the product’s characteristics: drugs are only available to consumer’s through a physi-
cian’s prescription, prescription drugs are stored in pharmacies, therefore the labels are not viewable 
by physicians when prescribing or consumers, and when the drug is dispensed to a consumer, the 
labeled bottle has been discarded or covered by the pharmacy’s label.  See generally id. 
 153. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the various commercial speech 
definitions). 
 154. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 351 (1948). 
 155. Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Con-
trols and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 90 n.143 (1995) [hereinafter Noah, Liberating 
Speech].  One difference to note is that in those cases, the products were available for consumers to 
view prior to purchasing.  Other scholars argue the speech is actually pure scientific information, 
worthy of full protection.  See generally Smith, supra note 36 at 965 (noting that scientific articles 
and books distributed by non-drug manufacturers are considered fully protected forms of “scientific 
and academic speech”).  However, using the Bolger approach, labels do satisfy the three characteris-
tics of commercial speech: an advertisement referring to a specific product which is economically 
motivated.  Polubinski, supra note 77, at 1016. 
 156. See supra notes 92-95, 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the WLF and Pearson 
findings). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/4
ENDEJANN1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:26 PM 
2002] IS THE FDA’S NOSE GROWING? 517 
2.  Does the Speech Involve Legal and Truthful Activity? 
If a manufacturer does not seek approval of a promoted off-label 
use, the drug is misbranded.157  Misbranding is a form of illegal conduct 
by the manufacturer.158  However, using the reasoning of WLF, both la-
beling and advertising of prescription drugs are legal activities even 
though inclusion of off-label information is prohibited by the FDCA.159 
Is the off-label information on labels and advertisements truthful or 
inherently misleading?  Essential to this analysis is determining the au-
dience.  For labels and advertisements, the audience is now the public, 
not just medical professionals.160  Consumers believe labels and adver-
tisements of prescription drugs are being regulated by the government, 
therefore lack of FDA approval for off-label use claims mislead the con-
sumer into thinking the off-label information is FDA approved.161  Also, 
consumers lack the ability to independently verify the off-label claims 
being promoted.162 
                                                          
 157. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1994 & Supp. 1998).  See also supra notes 66-68, 71-72 (discussing the 
FDA’s authority to misbrand drugs). 
 158. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 834. 
 159. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998).  
Courts have consistently rejected the FDA’s assertion that conduct is illegal because it is prohibited 
in the FDCA; therefore prohibitions on off-label claims do not make the conduct illegal.  See id.  
See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (unconstitutional prohibition of alcohol 
content on beer labels).  In Rubin, the Supreme Court did not entertain any argument that the statute 
prohibiting disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels inherently made the speech at issue concern 
an illegal activity.  See id. at 482-43. 
 160. See Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66-67 (noting a distinction between 
audiences composed of medical professionals and lay persons).  But see supra note 155 (distin-
guishing the availability of labels to influence consumer decisions).  By definition, prescription drug 
labels and advertisements cannot adequately inform consumers.  Noah, Advertising Prescription 
Drugs, supra note 73, 176 n.131.  “Prescription drugs are sold on a prescription basis. . .because the 
special expertise of a trained physician is necessary for their safe use.  Thus, an effective warning 
could go only to the medical profession, and not to an untrained patient.”  Dunkin v. Syntex Lab., 
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).  The current FDA regulations for labels and adver-
tising are insufficient to prevent consumer confusion because originally the regulations were intend-
ed to regulate activities aimed at medical professionals.  Michelle D. Ehrlich, Note, Doctors Can 
“Just Say No”: The Constitutionality of Consumer-Directed Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 12 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 535, 537 (1990). 
 161. See Polubinski, supra note 77, at 1026 (noting this argument is valid only when the audi-
ence is consumers, not physicians).  However, the Pearson court has seemingly rejected the argu-
ment.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the courts reasoning). 
 162. See Polubinski, supra note 77, at 1026.  As Vladeck explains: 
[b]ecause of the complexity of health claims, consumers cannot conceivably evaluate 
them on their own.  Indeed, no one realistically expects consumers to wade through vol-
umes of preliminary and often conflicting and inconclusive scientific literature involving 
clinical trials, laboratory animal experiments, and epidemiological studies to assess 
whether a particular health claim is well founded.  That task often confounds experts. 
Vladeck, supra note 138.  See also Ehrlich, supra note 160, at 550.  Advertisements shift the con-
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This information can also be misleading because there is an incen-
tive for manufacturers to only disclose selected information or fail to 
provide a balanced view.163  Audience manipulation occurs when a 
commercial transaction is proposed, encouraging the consumer to act 
without consulting opposing viewpoints, making this type of speech in-
herently misleading.164  An example of such an opportunity includes 
manufacturer promotion of off-label uses directly to consumers.  Adver-
tisements for prescription drugs often play upon the insecurities and van-
ities of consumers.165  Other advertisements offer premiums, such as re-
                                                          
sumer’s attention on the economic decision to purchase a drug, rather than a physiological evalua-
tion to determine the need for the drug.  Barbara Marticelli McGarey, Comment, Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Information—Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug 
Use, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 141-42 (1984).  The information given to the consumer does not 
promote safe use of the prescription drug.  Id. at 142.  Scientific, medical knowledge is required to 
understand information provided in a drug’s labeling and advertisement.  Id.  For example, an anti-
biotic may be contraindication for patients with kidney disease.  Id.  However, a physician is aware 
that the antibiotic may be safely used in such a patient by administering a lower dose of the antibi-
otic, thereby negating the warning included with the drug.  Id. 
 163. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 835.  Advertisements create a 
unique problem because of their “brevity.”  White, supra note 3, at 758.  They are misleading be-
cause they are so short, often leaving the consumer with the need for more information.  Id.  The 
format of DTC advertisements is not patient friendly.  See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Esq., Consumer-
Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. 
L.J. 829, 846 (1991).  Warnings are usually located on a separate page after the actual advertise-
ment, which is printed in very small type size.  Id.  But see Smith, supra note 36, at 1046-47. Manu-
facturer selectivity of information contained in advertisements and labels is unlikely because the 
potential liability and competitors functioning as industry watchdogs will deter any manufacturer 
selectivity.  Id. 
 164. Geyh, supra note 17, at 66-67.  There is some justification for regulation of speech, spe-
cifically when there is opportunity for audience manipulation.  Id. at 66.  When the audience is ma-
nipulated, it impairs their ability to rationally interpret information.  Id. at 66-67.  Once the audience 
is no longer capable of understanding the information, the purpose of the First Amendment, provid-
ing free flow of information, is diminished.  Id.  The danger to the public now outweighs the danger 
of speech suppression.  Id. at 68.  These proposals are suspect because the speaker has an economic 
incentive to embellish his claim, the audience has little chance to review opposing information and 
often involve appeals to irrational needs.  Id. at 71. 
 165. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 836.  Some examples of advertisements, which play upon 
consumer insecurities, include Estraderm, Nicorette, and Rogaine.  Id. at 836-37.  The advertise-
ments make statements such as: “[h]ot flashes and night sweats certainly don’t make women feel 
very attractive;” the smoker will “feel better, even look better.  And your family and friends will 
feel more comfortable being around you;” and a bald spot may “damage your ability to get along 
with others, influence your chances of obtaining a job or a date or even interfere with your job per-
formance.”  Id.  Praying on a person’s fears manipulates the consumer by reinforcing the consum-
er’s beliefs, which indirectly suggests that the beliefs are true or factual and therefore there is no 
need to consult opposing viewpoints.  Some companies even use celebrities to endorse the prescrip-
tion drug.  Fushman, supra note 75, at 1171.  Others also believe the manufacturers are manipulat-
ing consumers by catching them when they are vulnerable.  White, supra note 3, at 756 & nn.74-75.  
“Male fears of baldness were enough to push alopecia products to the No. 5 position on the list of 
largest gainers by therapeutic class for 1999.  [The number of prescriptions] were up 51%, to 1.7 
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bates and coupons, to encourage quick purchases.166  However, one may 
argue that there is no manipulation because manufacturers are required 
to advise consumers to visit a doctor, thereby fulfilling the requirement 
of seeking opposing viewpoints.167 
3.  Does the Government Have a Substantial Interest? 
If the speech is found to be legal and not inherently misleading, the 
government must then assert a substantial interest behind the regula-
tion.168  As the courts noted in both Pearson and WLF, protecting the 
health and safety of the public is a substantial interest.169  The govern-
ment also has interests in providing ample incentives for manufacturers 
to pursue FDA approval of the off-label use,170 as well as preventing 
consumer fraud and/or confusion.171 
4.  Does the Regulation Directly Advance the Government 
Interest? 
Because the FDA has deemed prescription drugs inherently danger-
ous, the regulations would directly advance the government’s interest in 
promoting the public’s health and safety.172  More specifically, off-label 
uses of prescription drugs are even more dangerous because, as the use 
of a prescription drug changes, so too does its safety.173  Because the au-
                                                          
million.”  Gebhart, supra note 2, at 39. 
 166. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 837. 
 167. At the same time, the ad also encourages the consumer to seek more information.  Id. at 
838.  The advertisement provides either a 1-800 number or Internet web-site, which is run by the 
manufacturer.  Id. 
 168. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test). 
 169. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Washington Legal Foun-
dation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 170. See Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
 171. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655-56. 
 172. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656 (arguing that because dietary supplements are not prescrip-
tion drugs, the risk of harm is decreased, whereas the risk of harm from prescription drugs is much 
greater).  Regulations directly advance the state interest because they do not prohibit all speech, but 
regulated only speech aimed at consumers, which protects only the government interests.  Ehrlich, 
supra note 160, at 552. 
 173. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 828-29.  The drug may be unsafe, 
ineffective or less effective.  Id. at 829 n.54.  Examples of new dangers resulting from off-label uses 
include anti-arrhythmic and calcium channel blockers.  See Citizen Petition, supra note 77, at 
59,824.  Medical research found that after a heart attack, persons with high rates of ventricular 
premature beats had a higher mortality (death) rate.  Id.  Anti-arrhythmic drugs, which decrease 
ventricular premature beat rates, were being promoted by manufacturers to decrease mortality.  Id.  
The FDA attempted to label the drugs to emphasize that there was no actual evidence to prove the 
result.  Id.  In a later clinical trial, it was discovered that the use of anti-arrhythmic drugs in this 
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dience is now the public at large, the impact of such labeling and adver-
tising has significantly increased.174  As noted previously, DTC advertis-
ing will impact more consumers, therefore, manufacturers will have 
even less incentive to pursue subsequent FDA approval if the off-label 
information can be freely promoted on the label and in advertisements to 
the public. 
5.  Is the Proposed Regulation No More Extensive than Necessary? 
Under this scenario, drug manufacturers would only be prohibited 
from placing off-label use claims on labels and in advertisements, how-
ever manufacturers would be free to promote off-label uses to medical 
professionals using other avenues.175  Also, research and dissemination 
of off-label uses by other sources would not be prohibited, therefore the 
regulations are narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interest in 
protecting the public’s health and safety. 
However, courts have also looked to the availability of other alter-
natives to achieve the government goal to determine if the regulation is 
no more extensive than necessary.176  An alternative available to the 
                                                          
condition actually increased mortality.  Id.  Another similar situation occurred with the substitution 
of calcium-channel blockers for beneficial beta-blockers after heart attacks.  Id.  It was later discov-
ered that the substituted drug had no benefit and decreased the chance of survival.  Id.  Another 
more recent example is the controversial off-label combination of fenfluramine and phentermine for 
weight loss.  After combining the drugs, medical researchers discovered an unexpected, abnormal 
incidence of heart valve disease in patients.  Id. 
  But see generally Beck, supra note 78 (arguing off-label uses are not dangerous).  Off-
label uses are not harmful because the FDA’s pre-market approval process ensures the product is 
safe for the labeled and general use.  Id. at 82.  “Off-label” is only a regulatory description or legal 
status of the drug use, not a medical status.  Id. at 83.  Because the opposite of “approved” is “unap-
proved,” there is a suggestion that the use is therefore “disapproved” or too unsafe or risky for the 
off-label use.  Id. at 83-84.  An “unapproved” use is not “disapproved,” it has merely not been re-
viewed by the FDA.  Id.  “Thus it is not possible to draw any conclusion about the safety or effec-
tiveness of a particular use of a drug. . .from the. . .legal status of that use as off-label.”  Id. at 84.  
However, a conclusion may be drawn: the FDA has not found the drug to be safe and effective for 
the off-label use.  Also, because the promotion will also involve DTC advertising, the potential for 
harm will be exacerbated because more consumers will request and be prescribed the off-label use.  
Noah, Liberating Speech, supra note 155, at 203. 
 174. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 836-37.  See also supra notes 74-75 
(discussing the increased impact of DTC advertising ).  In WLF, the audience was only medical pro-
fessionals who made the decision based upon the individual patient’s interest.  Id. at 836. 
 175. Manufacturers could continue to communicate off-label information to physicians using 
package inserts, the Physician’s Desk Reference, product cards, “Dear Doctor” letters and pharma-
ceutical representatives.  McGarey, supra note 161, at 118 & n.5. 
 176. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (“It is perfectly 
obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would 
be more likely to achieve the State’s goal. . . .”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 
(1995) (“[T]he availability of these options. . .indicates that [the statute] is more extensive than nec-
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FDA is to ban any product with an off-label use, however such a regula-
tion would be more deceptive to consumers and more extensive than 
necessary to protect the public.177  Another alternative is to mandate dis-
claimers on all labels and advertisements, similar to the disclaimers sug-
gested in Pearson,178 which disclose to the consumer that the claimed 
use is off-label, or not approved by the FDA.  Pearson is the first deci-
sion to mandate the use of disclaimers to avoid misleading speech.179  
Although some may consider disclaimers compelled speech,180 similar to 
International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy,181 the Supreme Court has 
hinted at supporting the use of such speech to counteract any possible 
misleading information.182  Courts may approve of compelling limited 
disclaimers, since they are less speech restrictive than complete prohibi-
tion.183 
The purpose of disclaimers is to combat any misleading infor-
mation, but can disclaimers truly fulfill this purpose?  Disclaimers may 
                                                          
essary.”). 
 177. See Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 875.  The consumer would not 
have any information concerning the use of the drug, or any way to receive such treatment.  Id.  See 
also Salbu, supra note 76, at 188-89 (commenting that it would also be impossible to ban off-label 
prescribing). By restricting the dissemination of off-label uses, such as under the FDAMA, the phy-
sician still has access to off-label use information, which may be provided to the patient.  Previous-
ly, it has been ruled that the FDA does not have the authority to ban products merely to avoid mis-
use.  Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs are Safe for Some, But Not Others: The FDA Experience and 
Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 927, 941-42 (1999) [hereinafter Safe for 
Some] (discussing American Pharm. Ass’n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974), in 
which the FDA attempted to limit the distribution of methadone to hospital pharmacies to avoid 
diversion). 
 178. See infra note 179 (discussing the disclaimers suggested by the court in Pearson v. Shala-
la). 
 179. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 828; Vladeck, supra note 138.  The 
Pearson court supported disclaimers such as: “[t]he FDA does not approve this claim,” or including 
adverse effects, which the manufacturer fails to include on the label.  Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 
650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 180. Noah, Liberating Speech, supra note 155, at 105; Harrison, supra note 48, at 634.  In 
Friedman, “there is no First Amendment rule. . .requiring a State to allow deceptive or misleading 
commercial speech whenever the publication of additional information can clarify or offset the ef-
fects of the spurious communication.”  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1979) (prohibition 
of practicing optometry under a trade name is constitutional). 
 181. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of compelled speech 
in International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 182. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) (“[A] warning or disclaimer might be 
appropriately required. . .in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”); 
Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 
(1976) (“They may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a 
form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent 
its being deceptive.”). 
 183. Noah, Liberating Speech, supra note 155, at 105. 
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actually increase consumer confusion, rather than help to enlighten con-
sumers.184  Some research indicates that FDA warnings do not adequate-
ly educate the reader, and as a result, the reader will ultimately dismiss 
the warning.185  Other concerns include the possibility of diluting the 
strength of warnings, and overreaction to numerous warnings.186  Dis-
claimers may also draw attention away from products with a proven 
benefit.187  There is also the possibility that evidence supporting the 
claim is outweighed by contradictory evidence, a situation which Pear-
son gives no direction.188  The claim may be based upon preliminary, in-
conclusive or deficient studies; if so, this information would also need to 
be disclosed in order to prevent any deception.189  Most importantly, dis-
claimers will not provide ample incentive for manufacturers to receive 
FDA approval of the off-label use.190  It is ironic that courts are able to 
                                                          
 184. Vladeck, supra note 138.  The disclaimers suggested in Pearson do not contain any in-
formation about the safety, effectiveness or risks associated with the off-label use.  Id.  Also, the 
disclaimers suggested by the court in Pearson are insufficient because they do not disclose to the 
consumer the actual standard used to validate health claims.  Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, 
supra note 81, at 848.  To be considered a full disclosure to the consumer, the disclaimer should 
indicate the reason for the lack of FDA approval, such as the lack of significant scientific agree-
ment.  Id. 
 185. Fushman, supra note 75, at 1173. 
 186. Noah, Liberating Speech, supra note 155, at 107 n.217.  The FDA has expressed its opin-
ion of disclaimers on product warnings as “a warning must be unencumbered and unambiguous.”  
Food, Drug, Cosmetic, Device Labeling- FDA Proposed Regulations Regarding Failure to Reveal 
Material Facts, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,232 (1974).  And “where warnings are required, disclama-
tory opinions necessarily detract from the warning in such a manner as to be confusing and mislead-
ing.”  Id.  Other agencies have prohibited the use of disclaimers accompanying warnings.  See, e.g., 
16 C.F.R. § 1500.122 (2000) (CPSC labeling requirements for hazardous substances); 40 C.F.R. § 
156.10(a)(5) (2000) (EPA label warnings for pesticides). 
 187. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 853. 
 188. Id. at 850.  An example involves a study to determine whether beta carotene supplements 
would provide the same cancer prevention benefits as provided in fruits and vegetables.  Id.  The 
study was stopped because researchers actually found an increase in the risk of cancer.  Id.  There-
fore, health claims based upon benefits received from foods do not necessarily show the same bene-
fits will result when the “active ingredient” is isolated and taken in supplement form.  Id. at 851. 
 189. Id. at 837-38. Possible solutions to prevent deception would be to provide more infor-
mation on the label as part of the disclaimer or mandating package inserts to disclose the same or 
more information.  Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 851.  Such extra infor-
mation would include a description of the studies relied on and limits of the studies.  Id.  However, 
as the amount of information increases, package inserts would be more beneficial in order to avoid 
label cluttering.  Schwartz, supra note 163, at 847. 
 190. E.g., Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 837; J. Howard Beales, III, 
Economic Analysis and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1370, 1386-87 (1994).  Manufacturers will not attempt to gain subsequent approval of the off-label 
use because the costs are too substantial and the benefits are considerably smaller than the initial 
approval.  Id.  Although ANDA’s used for approval of off-label uses presumably involve less inves-
tigation into safety and efficacy, therefore requiring less time, than a NDA for a new drug, actual 
ANDA approval involves the same amount of time because they are given lower priority.  Id. at 
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justify allowing drug manufacturers to disseminate unapproved infor-
mation, as well as place unapproved health claims on labels, by relying 
on the public’s right to know truthful, nonmisleading information,191 
whereas it is an insufficient reason to require such truthful, non-
misleading information on food labels.192 
B.  Implications for Drug Manufacturer Liability 
The purpose of FDA approval is to ensure the safety and efficacy of 
all labeled uses.193  If a manufacturer is able to include off-label infor-
mation on labels and in advertisements, is there any impact on the manu-
facturer’s liability? 
1.  Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Currently, drug manufacturers are exempted from the general rule 
of law requiring product manufacturers to provide an adequate warning 
to the ultimate consumer to avoid product liability.194  Drug manufactur-
ers fulfill the legal duty to warn by providing adequate warnings to phy-
sicians, coined the “learned intermediary.”195  An adequate warning to 
                                                          
1392. One suggestion is to amend the existing FDAMA to require the FDA to give priority review 
to manufacturers seeking FDA approval for off-label uses and only require notification of off-label 
information distribution, rather than pre-approval. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is it Worth the Trouble?  
The New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Off-Label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 663-64 (1999).  Others have 
pushed for legislative incentives such as market exclusivity or awarding royalties.  Gilhooley, Con-
stitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 856 n.216. 
 191. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998) (rea-
soning that the free flow of information is essential to a working democracy, therefore “a State’s 
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information 
unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it.” (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 497 (1996)); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (commenting that regula-
tions that are justified by beneficial public interest or keep consumers in the dark are suspect). 
 192. See International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996).  The state 
asserted a substantial government interest based on “strong consumer interest and the public’s right 
to know.”  Id.  “Unfortunately, mere consumer concern is not, in itself, a substantial interest.”  Id. at 
72 n.1.  The court remarked that if consumer interest alone was sufficient to justify disclosure, the 
government would be free to mandate disclosure of any relevant product information.  Id. at 73. 
 193. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing the drug approval process in the 
FDCA). 
 194. Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package 
Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1344 
(1999). 
 195. Id.  The learned intermediary doctrine was first created back in the 1960s.  See, e.g., Ster-
ling  Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (manufacturer has a duty to warn prescrib-
ing physicians of newly discovered side effects of an anti-arthritis medication); Love v. Wolf, 38 
Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964) (manufacturer has no duty to warn consumer since there is no contact with the 
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the physician will clearly convey any risk or contraindication that the 
manufacturer knows, or should know, is associated with the use of the 
prescription drug.196  The rationale for placing the ultimate duty to warn 
on physicians is: (1) to preserve the doctor-patient relationship, (2) phy-
sicians are in a better situation to inform patients, (3) manufacturers do 
not have a useful means to convey warnings to patients, (4) physicians 
make the ultimate decision to prescribe a drug, (5) patients are unable to 
understand the medical language, and (6) it is too difficult to warn pa-
tients because the risks and benefits are so varied and dependent upon 
the patient’s characteristics.197 
2.  Recognizing Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
The courts have carved out a limited number of exceptions to the 
learned intermediary doctrine including mass immunizations,198 contra-
ceptives,199 and the controversial “FDA-Mandate” exception.200  How-
                                                          
consumer); Marcus v. Specific Pharm. Inc., 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1948) (manufacturer not 
liable when failed to include proper infant dosages in ad to consumer, when provided to the pre-
scribing physician).  If a manufacturer fails to adequately warn the physicians, the manufacturer is 
directly liable to the patient.  See, e.g., McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974) 
(any breach of the duty to warn the physician will result in direct liability to the patient); Schene-
beck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970) (manufacturer directly liable to patient by 
not warning physicians of the risk of blindness after prolonged use of the drug). 
 196. Paytash, supra note 194, at 1345.  The duty to warn is never entirely fulfilled because the 
manufacturer must notify physicians of any risks or contraindications which are later discovered.  
Id. at 1345-46.  The legal standard for manufacturer warnings is one of reasonableness: warnings 
must be “given in a form that could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of a reasonably 
prudent physician.”  Harrison, supra note 48, at 625 (quoting Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 965 
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App. 1998)). 
 197. The rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription drugs may be best de-
scribed as: 
[P]rescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in 
effect.  As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the propen-
sities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.  His is the task of 
weighting the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers.  The choice he 
makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge 
of both patient and palliative. 
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 198. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).  The plaintiff re-
ceived a polio vaccination at a clinic, as part of a mass immunization against the spread of polio.  Id. 
at 122.  The court reasoned that the underlying premise of the learned intermediary doctrine was 
that manufacturers are not in a position to make an informed decision about whether or not to pre-
scribe a drug for an individual patient, but physicians are capable of making such an “individualized 
balancing . . . of the risks involved.”  Id. at 130-31.  However, in a mass immunization setting, the 
physician does not perform such a role.  Id. at 131.  In this case, the manufacturer also actively as-
sured the community of the safety of the vaccine.  Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Odgers v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).  See also White, supra note 3, at 751-55; 
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ever, many scholars are pushing for change as the many justifications201 
for the learned intermediary doctrine have changed.  Critics argue that 
physicians do not adequately warn patients, many drugs now have FDA 
mandated patient package inserts, and the doctor-patient relationship no 
longer exists in its original form.202  Many people urge that the learned 
intermediary doctrine should be abolished,203 while others compromise 
by advocating a DTC exception.204  Of course, there are still learned in-
                                                          
Schwartz, supra note 163, at 832-34 (offering in-depth discussions on the learned intermediary ex-
ceptions).  However, most jurisdictions decline to recognize a contraceptive exception.  See, e.g., 
MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp 417 (D.D.C. 1991); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. 
Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co. 748 F. Supp. 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 200. See Fushman, supra note 75, at 1167-68.  Under the FDA-Mandate exception, failure to 
comply with FDA regulations precluded the use of the learned intermediary doctrine.  See id. (dis-
cussing Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997)).  But see In re Norplant Contra-
ceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an FDA-mandate ex-
ception to the learned intermediary doctrine).  In Norplant, the court held that the rationale behind 
the doctrine is to enable manufacturers to supply unavoidably unsafe products to consumers by 
shielding them from liability.  Id. at 379.  And the court found no reason to expose manufacturers to 
liability when the FDA has determined that the drug requires additional warnings due to the severity 
of side effects.  Id. 
 201. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for the learned inter-
mediary doctrine). 
 202. Schwartz, supra note 163, at 831.  Other factors including the nature of the product, mar-
keting techniques, and the increasing patient involvement also support limited the learned interme-
diary doctrine.  Id. at 835.  The learned intermediary doctrine contradicts the theory of informed 
consent and the trend of patient self-determination.  Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doc-
trine to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 931, 957 (1993). 
 203. See White, supra note 3, at 770.  As consumers have become more knowledgeable, the 
physician-patient relationship has changed dramatically.  Physicians no longer exercise independent 
judgment.  Manufacturers actively pursue and encourage consumers to try products.  Id. at 777.  
Physicians are in the middle because they do not like the new “aggressive” patient, however, they 
often succumb to the patients desire for fear the patient will visit another doctor.  Id.  See also 
Schwartz, supra note 163, at 844. 
 204. See, e.g., Fushman, supra note 75, at 1183; Schwartz, supra note 163, at 839-41 (analo-
gizing to the abolishment of privity for warranties because of massive advertising and overpromo-
tion).  In the preliminary draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, drafters in-
cluded three exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine: 
i.  the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that no medical provider was in the po-
sition to receive the warnings and to reduce the risks of harm]; or  
ii.  Food and Drug Administration regulations required that direct warnings be provided; 
or 
iii.  the manufacturer advertised or otherwise promoted the drug or medical device di-
rectly to users and consumers. 
Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs, supra note 73, at 163.  However, the drafters ultimately de-
leted the advertising exception because it is “a relatively new phenomenon and has as yet not gener-
ated case law.”  Id. at 164.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998) 
(failing to include a DTC advertising exception).  Only the Supreme Court of New Jersey has rec-
ognized a DTC exception.  See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).  However, 
Perez’s reach may be limited because rebuttable presumption that compliance with FDA regulations 
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termediary supporters.205 
Another such change could be the advent of off-label use advertis-
ing and labeling.  Just as the recent push for a direct-to-consumer adver-
tising exception, the inclusion of off-label use information to consumers 
strengthens the justifications for an exception.206  Under the learned in-
termediary doctrine, manufacturers must provide the physician with all 
known risks and continually monitor drug use for any new risks.207  
However, as explained in Section IV, an off-label use has not been ap-
proved by the FDA, therefore manufacturers do not know all the risks 
associated with the particular off-label use.  One possible solution is to 
hold manufacturers liable because they have a duty to warn physicians 
of risks they should know.  Manufacturers would then have a duty to ad-
equately test the off-label use, or else be liable for any harm cause by the 
drug.  Physicians should not be required to get informed consent, be-
cause that would require physicians to know the regulatory status of 
drugs and understand the process.208 
                                                          
provides an adequate warning, a plaintiff must also prove that they detrimentally relied on the actual 
advertisement, which caused the resulting harm.  Fushman, supra note 75, at 1180. 
  But see Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Polley v. Ci-
ba-Geigy Corp., 658 F. Supp. 420 (D. Alaska 1987); Mikell v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., 649 So. 2d. 
75 (La. Ct. App. 1994).  See also Harrison, supra note 48, at 613-14 (discussing these cases which 
expressly reject a DTC exception). 
 205. Harrison, supra note 48, at 606.  Even with the advent of DTC, the learned intermediary 
doctrine is still relevant because the physician-patient relationship has not changed.  Id.  Carving out 
a DTC exception would interfere with manufacturer’s First Amendment rights, in an already tightly 
regulated field.  Id. at 606-07. Also result in costs to technological advancements and litigation, ad-
equate warnings are too difficult to convey to consumers.  Id. at 619-37.  Others warn that creating 
manufacturer liability will result in the conveyance of less information to consumers.  Noah, Adver-
tising Prescription Drugs, supra note 73, at 169.  Rather, manufacturer involvement in informing 
patients should only function as a supplement to the information provided by the physician, without 
creating liability for the manufacturer.  Id. at 175; McGarey, supra note 162, at 148-49. 
 206. Physicians have been exposed to massive advertising campaigns by manufacturers, and 
have been able to decipher what information they will use, however; consumers have not been in 
this position.  See Harrison, supra note 48, at 621. 
 207. Paytash, supra note 194, at 1345-46.  If the manufacturer fails to monitor for new risks or 
fails to inform the physician of newly discovered risks, the manufacturer will be directly liable to 
the patient.  Id. at 1346. 
 208. Beck, supra note 78, at 86, 100.  Although details of state informed consent laws vary, 
they generally require physicians to explain to patients the medical risks, medical benefits, the na-
ture of the treatment and the medical condition intended to remedy.  Id. at 86.  Informed consent 
does not require physicians to know or disclose the state of the informed consent law because it is 
not relevant to the medical risk.  Id.  This type of information is more akin to the function of an at-
torney, who is able to assess the legal status of a drug.  Id. at 87. 
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3.  Evidence of Off-Label Use in Medical Malpractice 
Recently, a Tennessee Court of Appeals held that evidence regard-
ing a drug’s off-label use in a medical malpractice action was relevant 
and did not pose any risk of unfair prejudice.209 
In this case, the physician prescribed a drug to retard a patient’s 
premature contractions, which was an off-label use.210  Ultimately, the 
patient suffered a heart attack after complaining of chest pains after each 
dose of the drug.  The trial court granted the physician’s motion to pre-
vent the patient from introducing evidence indicating that the FDA had 
not approved the drug for use in preventing premature labor.211  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the physician.212 
On appeal, the court reviewed the FDA regulatory process and the 
role of off-label uses within the medical practice.213  The court held that 
the labeling and reference information is admissible to prove the stand-
ard of care, but do not establish the standard of care by themselves.214  
Therefore, any deviation from the manufacturer labeling, in and of itself, 
does not constitute a breach of the standard of care.215  The court dis-
carded the contention that the evidence concerning the off-label use 
would confuse the issues or mislead the jury.216  The court believed the 
exclusion of the off-label use evidence hampered the patient’s ability to 
prove malpractice and, more probable than not, affected the outcome of 
the trial; therefore the court vacated and remanded for a new trial.217 
                                                          
 209. Richardson v. Miller, 2000 WL 1157246, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2000). 
 210. The drug, terbutaline, was approved by the FDA to treat asthma.  However, terbutaline is 
also widely used as a tocolytic agent because its smooth muscle relaxation effects can cause relaxa-
tion of the uterus, thereby preventing premature labor and birth. The physician did not have any 
personal experience with this off-label use, however he was aware of this off-label use from profes-
sional articles and the drug manufacturer’s seminar.  Id. at *2. 
 211. Id. at *3. 
 212. Id. at *4. 
 213. Richardson, 2000 WL 1157246 at *4-*9. 
 214. Id. at *10.  If the information established the standard of care, it in effect allows the drug 
manufacturer rather than the medical profession to do so.  Id.  The information on the label may not 
be easily understood by the jury without expert assistance because the documents are prepared for 
the medical profession.  Id.  The labels reflect the requirements of FDA regulations in order to pro-
vide guidelines for promotion and liability.  Id.  Finally, the information can not be cross-examined.  
Id.  However, some courts have used labeling and reference information to establish the standard of 
care.  See, e.g.,  Haught v. Macelich, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982); Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 
30 (S.D. 1974); Ohligschlager v. Proctor Cmty. Hosp., 303 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. 1973). 
 215. Richardson v. Miller, 2000 WL 1157246, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2000). 
 216. Id. at *15.  The information would not mislead or confuse the jury because the jury would 
be presented with expert testimony to the standard of care, subject to cross-examination, contrary 
evidence and the appropriate instructions for weighing such evidence.  Id. 
 217. Id. at *16 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In essence, the WLF and Pearson decisions may have actually un-
dermined a large portion of the FDA regulatory power over prescription 
drugs.218  Although manufacturers are still required to receive pre-
market approval of a new drug, once approved the manufacturer could 
promote, label, and advertise the drug for other indications.  This pro-
vides manufacturers with a prime opportunity to get approval for a 
“cheap, narrow indication and the next day begin selling the drug for 
multiple broad, and profitable other indications.”219  As the use of a pre-
scription drug changes, the safety and efficacy changes as well.220  By 
allowing drug manufacturers to label and advertise off-label uses to the 
general public, the potential harm to the public’s health and safety in-
creases dramatically.221  The off-label use claims do not contribute to 
more enlightened consumers.  Instead, consumers are misled and con-
fused because they do not possess the requisite medical knowledge to 
understand the off-label use claim being made and its associated risks.222  
Congress enacted the FDCA for the purpose of protecting the public’s 
health and safety, and gave the FDA the authority to pass regulations in 
pursuance of this goal.  The FDA has exercised its authority using the 
approval process and misbranding provisions for over 60 years.  Only 
recently has this authority been questioned, as manufacturers realized 
large profits, attributable to direct-to-consumer advertising, and consum-
                                                          
 218. Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 820.  Congress may only be able to 
require disclaimers as to the lack of FDA approval for new uses.  Id.  However, the decisions do not 
implicate the initial FDA approval of an entirely new drug.  Id.  However, the Supreme Court has 
upheld the principle that all claims by the manufacturer need FDA approval.  See Weinberger v. 
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S 609, 667-68 (1973).  The courts should avoid deciding 
on constitutional grounds.  Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Law, supra note 81, at 821.  The actions 
should be analyzed using standards of administrative agency review, wherein courts will not substi-
tute their own judgment if there is a reasonable decision by the agency.  Id. at 821, 867.  Courts are 
ill-equipped to determine issues of acceptable risks to public health and safety in such specialized 
and advanced practices.  See id. at 836.  Congress delegated and instructed the FDA to determine a 
“procedure and standard” for determining the validity of a health claim for dietary supplements and 
regulations involving prescription drugs.  Id. at 852.  Therefore, these decisions have also ques-
tioned Congress’ authority to protect the public’s health and safety.  Id. at 828. 
 219. Salbu, supra note 76, at 206 (quoting James G. Dickinson, FDA Letter, Deputy’s Speech, 
Define a Dilemma, Med. Mktg. Media. Oct. 1996, at 12). 
 220. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing examples of harmful off-label uses 
of prescription drugs); But see supra note 173 (arguing that off-label uses do not affect the safety 
and efficacy profile of a prescription drug). 
 221. See supra notes 74-75, 174 and accompanying text (discussing the increased impact of 
DTC advertising). 
 222. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (distinguishing between medical profes-
sional and consumer knowledge regarding prescription drugs). 
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ers enjoyed the wealth of information and power to influence prescribing 
habits of physicians.  However, under the Central Hudson analysis,223 
the government’s substantial interest in protecting the public’s health 
and safety is directly advanced by prohibiting drug manufacturers from 
labeling and advertising off-label uses on prescription drugs.224  This 
prohibition is no more extensive than necessary because it still allows 
physicians access to the off-label use information using other forms of 
communication with the drug manufacturer and the alternative, mandat-
ing disclaimers, is not sufficient to prevent consumer confusion.225  
Therefore, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label use labeling and advertis-
ing does not violate the drug manufacturer’s First Amendment rights. 
Nicole Endejann 
                                                          
 223. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test). 
 224. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (analyzing whether the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial and directly advanced by the regulation under the Central Hudson 
test). 
 225. See supra notes 175-92 and accompanying text (analyzing the extensiveness of the gov-
ernment regulation under the Central Hudson test). 
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